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Introduction 
In 2019, the U.S. Government spent 1.2 trillion dollars on health 
care, just under a third of total U.S. tax revenue.1 Not surprisingly, 
fraud, waste, and abuse in U.S. healthcare spending are a major source 
of concern for the federal government, which has observed that: “Every 
year, the submission of false claims to the government cheats the 
American taxpayer out of billions of dollars . . . . In some cases, 
unscrupulous actors undermine federal healthcare programs or 
circumvent safeguards meant to protect the public health.”2 To protect 
the integrity of healthcare spending, the federal government relies 
heavily on the Federal False Claims Act (“FCA”), a federal-wide anti-
fraud statute, to root out, punish, and deter fraud, waste, and abuse in 
the healthcare industry.3 In 2019, the DOJ recovered $3.05 billion in 
FCA judgments and settlements, with $2.6 billion originating from 
health care and life sciences companies, including drug and medical 
device manufacturers, hospitals, and pharmacies.4 It was the tenth 
 
1. Briefing Book, TAX POL’Y CTR., https://www.taxpolicycenter.org
/briefing-book/how-much-does-federal-government-spend-health-care 
[https://perma.cc/E2JQ-KM9Q] (last visited Dec. 3, 2019). In 2017, the 
U.S. government spent even more on healthcare – 1.2 trillion 
dollars. See National Health Expenditures 2017 Highlights, 
CMS.GOV, https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/
Statistics-Trends-andReports/NationalHealthExpendData/Downloads/
highlights.pdf [https://perma.cc/S24S-7ZEV] (last visited Oct. 4, 2020). 
2. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Recovers Over 




3. 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2018). 
4. Daniel Wilson, Health Care Fraud Made Up Bulk of Feds’ $3B Recovery 
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consecutive year that health care-related judgments and settlements 
exceeded $2 billion.5 
In recent years, a significant number of healthcare FCA cases have 
been predicated not on a theory that the defendant committed an overt 
act of fraud, but on assertions that, though the items or services for 
which claims were submitted were rendered, such items or services 
failed, in some way, to conform to the intricate web of Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”) regulations, rules, policies, 
guidance, commentary, and course of dealings that serve to signal to 
Medicare participants the terms of CMS’s reimbursement.6 These cases, 
which are brought under what is referred to as a theory of “legal 
falsity,” have held that a claim may be false even though, on its face, 
it accurately describes the items or services delivered, if the claim was 
tainted by a violation of law such that the government, if aware of the 
violation, would not consider the claimant to have a right to 
reimbursement. As a result, the FCA has increasingly become a means 
to punish and deter not only conduct that is commonly understood to 
be fraudulent, but also a wide range of non-compliance with any 
number of healthcare rules and regulations and agency sub-regulatory 
guidance. While this expansion of the FCA has served an important 
role in the protection of the integrity of federal healthcare programs, 
courts have struggled to draw a coherent and consistent line between 
commonplace non-conformance with any number of CMS’s innumerable 
programmatic rules and guidance, and violations that are significant 
enough to render a claim fraudulent. FCA cases have, therefore, been 
marred by a remarkable level of unpredictability as to whether and 
when the FCA may be deployed as a legitimate tool to deter and punish 
run-of-the-mill fraud, and when its use crosses the line into misuse as 
an all-purpose regulatory and breach of contract enforcement 
mechanism for federal healthcare programs. 
In its pivotal 2016 opinion in Universal Health Services, Inc. v. 
United States ex rel. Escobar, the Supreme Court attempted to draw 
just such a line, when it sought to identify a meaningful distinction 
between mere non-compliance with program standards and fraud.7 In 
an effort to unify years of inconsistent treatment of FCA cases by lower 
courts, the Court held that a legal falsity case must be based on a 
violation of “material” rules and regulations, compliance with which is 
a prerequisite to reimbursement, and not on immaterial rules and 
regulations that do not impact the government’s willingness to pay a 
 
5. Id. 
6. See, e.g., the various Medicare manuals available at Internet Only 
Manuals, CMS.GOV, https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/
Guidance/Manuals/Internet-Only-Manuals-IOMs 
[https://perma.cc/RFS8-58D5] (last visited Oct. 4, 2020). 
7. See Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. 
Ct. 1989 (2016). 
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claim.8 Unfortunately, the resulting line, for reasons discussed in this 
article, has proven too difficult to apply with consistency. Judges, 
lawyers, whistleblowers, and members of the healthcare industry have 
been largely unsuccessful in bringing clarity, consistency and, 
ultimately, predictability to Escobar’s vague requirement that a 
violation of the FCA predicated on legal falsity requires a “material” 
misrepresentation of compliance with law. 
In its 2019 decision in Azar v. Allina Health Services,9 the Supreme 
Court addressed whether CMS, by simply posting an announcement on 
the CMS website, could implement a rule that affected hospitals’ 
entitlement to Medicare reimbursement.10 CMS argued that the rule at 
issue was interpretive, and, therefore, exempt from notice-and-comment 
requirements.11 Affirming the D.C. Circuit’s 2017 holding in Allina v. 
Price,12 and breaking with most courts that had considered the 
question, the Supreme Court held, based on a largely textual analysis 
of the Medicare Act, that: (i) rules that have an impact on a right to 
payment are “substantive rules” under the Medicare Act, and (ii) the 
Medicare Act’s procedural requirements do not contain an exception to 
notice-and-comment requirements for substantive interpretive rules.13 
In other words, the Allina court held that analysis of CMS rulemaking 
under the Medicare Act must diverge from traditional Administrative 
Procedure Act (“APA”) analysis.14 Specifically, the Court held that 
 
8. Id. at 1994. 
9. Azar v. Allina Health Servs., 139 S. Ct. 1804 (2019). 
10. Id. at 1808. 
11. Id. at 1805. 
12. 863 F.3d 937 (D.C. Cir. 2017). The court held: 
[A]s relevant here, the Medicare Act requires notice-and-comment 
rulemaking for any (1) “rule, requirement, or other statement of 
policy” that (2) “establishes or changes” (3) a “substantive legal 
standard” that (4) governs “payment for services.” All four 
requirements are readily met here . .. HHS argues that the 
Medicare Act incorporates the APA’s exceptions to notice-and-
comment requirements. According to HHS, even if the decision to 
include Part C days in the fiscal year 2012 Medicare fractions is 
a rule, it is at most an “interpretive rule” for purposes of the APA. 
As a result, it is exempt from the APA’s—and, by extension, the 
Medicare Act’s—notice-and-comment requirements. The problem 
with that argument is that the Medicare Act does not incorporate 
the APA’s interpretive-rule exception to the notice-and-comment 
requirement. 
 Id. at 943–44. 
13. Allina, 139 S. Ct. at 1811. 
14. Prior to the D.C. Circuit Court’s opinions in Price and Clarian Health 
West, LLC v. Hargan, 878 F.3d 346 (D.C. Cir. 2017), it appears that 
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under the Medicare Act, any change to, or issuance of, a “substantive 
legal standard” (other than one appearing in a National Coverage 
Determination (“NCD”)) having an impact on payment under the 
Medicare program, must receive notice and public comment.15 
Thus, whereas under the APA there are three categories of rules—
legislative, interpretive, and procedural—with the latter two categories 
being excluded from the requirement of notice-and-comment rule 
making,16 under the Medicare Act there would appear to be only two 
categories of rules: substantive (which may impact payment and must 
be adopted as regulations) and procedural (which may not impact a 
right to payment but may appear either in sub-regulatory guidance or 
be adopted as regulations).17 Substantive interpretive rules, as such, 
simply do not exist in the world of Medicare reimbursement.18 
Consequently, in analyzing a healthcare program participant’s right to 
payment, non-binding sub-regulatory guidance is not due the deference 
it would be afforded as an interpretive rule under the APA, as such 
deference is unique to, and dependent on, the establishment of that 
class of rules by Congress in the APA.19 After Allina, rules that are 
 
every court of appeals that had considered the issue held that that the 
Medicare Act incorporated the same exception for interpretive rules to 
notice-and-comment rulemaking as did the Administrative Procedure 
Act. Graham Haviland, Not So Different after All: The Status of 
Interpretive Rules in the Medicare Act, 85 U. OF CHI. L. REV. 1511, 1523 
(2018). See, e.g., Via Christi Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Leavitt, 509 F.3d 
1259, 1277 n.11 (10th Cir. 2007); Baptist Health v. Thompson, 458 F.3d 
768, n.8 (8th Cir. 2006); Omni Manor Nursing Home v. Thompson, No. 
04-3836, at 427, 428 (6th Cir. Oct. 11, 2005); Warder v. Shalala, 149 F.3d 
73, 79 n.4 (1st Cir. 1998); See also Monmouth Med. Ctr. v. Thompson, 
257 F.3d 807, 814 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (noting the question of whether 
the Medicare Act incorporates the APA’s interpretive-rule exception, but 
not expressly deciding it). 
15. Allina, 139 S. Ct. at 1812, 1814.  
16. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (2018) (exempting from the notice-and-comment 
process rules, among others, involving “rules of agency organization, 
procedure, or practice” and interpretative rules and general statements of 
policy); see generally Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 
92, 96 (2015). 
17. See Allina, 139 S. Ct. at 1811, 1814. 
18. See id. at 1811. 
19. Under the APA, the exception for interpretive rules gives the agency the 
authority to gap-fill and that authority results in the extension of judicial 
deference to agency decisions: “If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the 
agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to 
elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation. Such legislative 
regulations are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, 
capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute. Sometimes the legislative 
delegation to an agency on a particular question is implicit rather than 
explicit. In such a case, a court may not substitute its own construction 
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substantive require notice-and-comment rule making, if they are to be 
given legal effect; rules that are procedural, even though they may be 
ultimately determinative of an outcome, do not require notice-and-
comment rule making.20 
Allina has largely been treated by academics and commentators as 
a limited ruling on a niche issue of administrative procedure.21 In 
actuality, however, by articulating the procedural requirements that 
must be met in order for CMS to impose a standard affecting payment 
as a rule with the “force and effect of law,” (i.e., by subjecting all 
substantive rules that govern payment for services to notice-and-
comment), Allina has far-reaching implications for healthcare industry 
liability under the FCA. Most importantly, it limits those requirements 
that can be considered to be legally binding—and, therefore, can serve 
as a predicate for FCA liability—to those that are substantive and 
properly adopted via notice-and-comment rulemaking. All other 
guidance is sub-regulatory and has only some evidentiary utility in 
establishing scienter (as evidence that industry participants were aware 
of the rule) and that the government views a requirement as material 
(as opposed to defining the substance of the rule at issue).22 
Allina, therefore, unceremoniously and without explicit recognition, 
sets a clear boundary between technical and immaterial violations of 
 
of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the 
administrator of an agency.” Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984); see also Kisor v. Wilkie, 588 
139 S. Ct. 2400, 2418 (2019) (discussing the latitude given to agencies to 
interpret their own regulations under the so-called Auer deference, and 
imposing no restrictions related to whether or not the interpretation 
infringes on a right or creates a new obligation, but rather looking only 
to whether there is a genuine ambiguity in the regulation, the 
agency’s interpretation is reasonable, and the character and context of the 
agency interpretation entitles it to controlling weight and concluding that: 
“The upshot of all this goes something as follows. When it applies, Auer 
deference gives an agency significant leeway to say what its own rules 
mean. In so doing, the doctrine enables the agency to fill out the 
regulatory scheme Congress has placed under its supervision.”).  
20. See JARED P. COLE & TODD GARVEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., GENERAL 
POLICY STATEMENTS: LEGAL OVERVIEW 1 (2016), https://fas.org/
sgp/crs/misc/R44468.pdf [https://perma.cc/R86Z-WPRB]. 
21. See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck & Anne Joseph O’Connell, Opinion Analysis: 
Notice and Comment Under the Medicare Act, No Big Moves for 
the APA, SCOTUSBLOG, (June 4, 2019, 10:54 AM), 
https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/06/opinion-analysis-notice-and-
comment-under-the-medicare-act-no-big-moves-for-the-apa/ 
[https://perma.cc/TTM6-RSR7]; see also Allisa Newman, A Lesson in 
Statutory Interpretation: Azar v. Allina Health Services and Implications 
for the Healthcare and Administrative Law Worlds, MINN. L. REV.: 
BLOG (Feb. 27, 2019), https://minnesotalawreview.org/2019/02/27/a-
lesson-in-statutory-interpretation/ [https://perma.cc/G879-3RD5]. 
22. See generally Allina, 139 S. Ct. at 1804. 
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CMS policy and the potential universe of violations of CMS rules 
sufficient to support an allegation of legal falsity under the FCA. 
Following Allina, the set of rules that can be considered material for 
purposes of an FCA action is restricted to substantive, binding rules.23 
Not all of these rules will be material, however, thereby further 
restricting the rules that can be used as a predicate for such liability. 
In other words, status as a properly promulgated substantive rule is 
necessary but not sufficient for FCA liability to follow. 
In Section I below, for background and context, we turn to a 
discussion of the history and dynamics of the FCA. In particular, we 
focus on the parameters of a claim of legal falsity and explore examples 
of cases where deviations from sub-regulatory guidance have been used 
as a basis for asserting legal falsity under the FCA. This Section 
demonstrates that, notwithstanding the fact that the FCA is intended 
to address only material misrepresentations that constitute a fraud 
against the government, utilizing a theory of legal falsity, the 
government has bootstrapped non-binding, sub-regulatory guidance 
into legal effect via traditional deference analysis, thereby using the 
FCA as an all-purpose regulatory and sub-regulatory enforcement 
mechanism. In Section II below, we discuss the materiality standard 
articulated in Escobar, and in Section III, we demonstrate that this 
standard has proved too abstract and unpredictable a measure to 
curtail the use of the FCA in this overly-broad and punitive manner. 
In Section IV, we explore the meaning of the holding in Allina that 
establishes which CMS rules are binding. In Section V, we show how 
applying Allina’s holding to screen out non-binding rules, significantly 
narrows the field of standards upon which the materiality test must be 
applied, ensuring that the materiality test will be applied only to rules 
that are significant enough that the government has seen fit to enact 
them by notice-and-comment rulemaking. While Escobar’s materiality 
standard remains opaque, applying the holding of Allina to FCA legal 
falsity cases in the manner that we propose in Section VI will go a long 
way in providing much needed fairness and predictability to FCA 
enforcement and promoting appropriate use of the FCA, which carries 
harsh penalties to punish and deter fraud, and avoid use of the FCA as 
an all-purpose regulatory and contractual enforcement mechanism. 
I. The Federal False Claims Act 
A. A Brief Background of the FCA 
The FCA is a civil war-era statute designed to punish contractors 
who submit false claims to the government for payment for items or 
 
23. See id. at 1805. 
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services.24 It imposes liability on any person who “knowingly presents, 
or causes to be presented, a false or fraudulent claim for payment or 
approval; [or] knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a 
false record or statement material to a false or fraudulent claim.”25 Due 
to both the sheer volume of federal spending on healthcare and the 
complexity of the rules governing federal healthcare reimbursement, 
there are many opportunities to use the FCA to prosecute fraud in 
connection with federal health care programs.26 Indeed, sixty-six percent 
of all FCA cases brought in 2018 dealt with claims submitted to the 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.27 The FCA authorizes 
private citizens, known as “relators,” to step into the shoes of the 
United States and to bring actions on the government’s behalf, and 
incentivizes relators to do so by providing them with a share of the 
substantial damages and penalties available under the FCA.28 FCA 
suits are, consequently, quite common, with whistleblowers, alone, filing 
645 qui tam suits in fiscal year 2018, constituting eighty-four percent 
of all FCA suits filed that year.29 
The Medicare Act has at its disposal a number of tools to assure 
that Medicare gets what it is paying for. These include suspension of 
 
24. David L. Haron et al., Bad Mules: A Primer on the Federal and Michigan 
False Claims Acts, 88 MICH. BAR J. 22, 22 (2009). 
25. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A-B) (2018). Liability under the False Claims Act 
occurs when a person: (1) knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, 
to an officer or employee of the United States Government . . . a false or 
fraudulent claim for payment or approval; (2) knowingly makes, uses, or 
causes to be made or used, a false record or statement to get a false or 
fraudulent claim paid or approved by the Government; [or] (3) conspires 
to defraud the Government by getting a false or fraudulent claim allowed 
or paid. 
26. See Haron et al., supra note 24. 
27. See Suzanne Jaffe Bloom, Benjamin Sokoly & Cristina I. Calvar, False 
Claims Act, Government Fraud, & Qui Tam Litigation, WINSTON & 
STRAWN LLP (Jan. 11, 2019), https://www.winston.com/
print/content/1016897/false-claims-government-program-fraud-and-qui-
tam-litigation.pdf [https://perma.cc/CFE2-43RK] (“Furthermore, fiscal 
year 2018 saw the commencement of 506 new FCA matters (nearly 66 
percent of the 767 new matters initiated) involving the health care 
industry.”). 
28. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 2 (noting that the Department of 
Justice obtained more than $2.8 billion in settlements and judgments from 
civil cases involving fraud and false claims against the government in the 
fiscal year ending Sept. 30, 2018). 
29. Id. 
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payment,30 recoupment,31 program exclusion,32 civil money penalties,33 
recovery of damages,34 criminal prosecution,35 and corporate integrity 
agreements,36 to name a few. Among this arsenal of tools to protect the 
integrity of federal healthcare spending, the FCA is favored because it 
allows for prosecution by private citizen relators and the possibility of 
collections not only of treble damages, but also substantial per-claim 
penalties.37 Given that a finding of FCA liability requires that the 
defendant have engaged in a fraud and applies penalties without 
reference to real economic damage, the FCA is not, however, always an 
appropriate tool for mediating payment disputes. Payment disputes are, 
fundamentally, contractual disputes. What is more, they may arise from 
differing or insignificant interpretations of payment-related guidance or 
rules, and in situations where the government has received most, if not 
all, of what it has paid for. 
B. Factual Falsity 
In its most straightforward form, the FCA bars “factually false” 
claims to the federal government for reimbursement for items or services 
that have not been provided (e.g., delivering 10 mules and billing for 
100 racehorses).38 A claim may also be factually false if it is for items 
or serviced provided in a manner that deviates from what is claimed to 
have been provided (e.g., billing for transporting 100 racehorses in time 
for Monday’s race, and delivering the horses on Tuesday).39 In both 
instances, the claims for reimbursement would be “factually false” 
because the claimant misrepresented a fact about the item or service 
for which the government has paid. With respect to Medicare, both 
claims for a health care item or service that was not provided, and 
claims for items or services that were provided, but in a manner that 
 
30. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1395mm (2018). 
31. E.g., 42 C.F.R. § 405.371 (2019). 
32. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7 (2018). 
33. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3 (2018). 
34. E.g., 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2018). 
35. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1395ss (2018). 
36. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ddd (2018). 
37. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729(a), 3730 (2018). 
38. See Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687, 697 (2d Cir. 2001). “False claims” 
under the FCA take a variety of forms. In the paradigmatic case, a claim 
is false because it “involves an incorrect description of goods or services 
provided or a request for reimbursement for goods or services never 
provided.” Id. 
39. See, e.g., United States v. Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 800 F. 
Supp. 2d 143, 154 (D.D.C. 2011) (citing United States v. Sci. Applications 
Int’l Corp. (SAIC II), 626 F.3d 1257, 1266 (D.C. Cir. 2010)).  
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was “so insufficient and negligent that the claims . . . amounted to 
fraud,” could be factually false.40 As one commentator explained: 
“Substandard care may be so extreme as to lead to factually false 
claims, or claims for worthless services.”41 
In a recent example of a criminal FCA case predicated on a theory 
of factual falsity, the government alleged that a defendant submitted a 
claim for reimbursement for services that were not provided. In that 
case, the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York indicted 
an ophthalmologist for healthcare fraud, alleging that the physician 
(“GOYAL”) fraudulently billed millions of dollars “for complex eye 
surgeries that GOYAL had not actually performed . . . . GOYAL and 
his Practice engaged in widespread healthcare fraud by consistently 
‘upcoding’ these and other surgical procedures, examinations, and tests 
in fraudulent billings submitted to Medicare and Medicaid . . . . 
GOYAL also falsified patient medical records, pressured other 
employees in his Practice to engage in the scheme, and initiated debt 
collection proceedings against patients who did not pay the full 
amounts of his fraudulently billed charges.”42 
Another recent FCA case in the Ninth Circuit that was predicated 
on a theory of factual falsity involved allegations that a service was so 
worthless that to bill for it amounted to a false claim.43 In this case, 
allegations included that the operator of regional clinical laboratories 
had falsified laboratory test data when test results fell outside the 
acceptable standard of error, rendering useless tests that were billed to 
Medicare as performed.44 The court explained: “[i]n an appropriate case, 
knowingly billing for worthless services or recklessly doing so with 
deliberate ignorance may be actionable under § 3729 [of the False 
Claims Act], regardless of any false certification conduct.”45 
Commenting on this holding, the Second Circuit stated: “We agree that 
a worthless services claim is a distinct claim under the Act. It is 
 
40. See United States v. NHC Health Care Corp., 163 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1053 
(W.D. Mo. 2001). 
41. John T. Brennan, Jr. & Michael W. Paddock, Limitations on the Use of 
the False Claims Act to Enforce Quality of Care Standards, J. HEALTH & 
LIFE SCI. LAW 39, 48 (2008), https://www.crowell.com/documents/Use-
of-the-False-Claims-Act-to-Enforce-Quality-of-Care-Standards.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/CN5H-5ECU]. 
42. Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, S. Dist. of N.Y., Manhattan U.S. 
Attorney Announces Indictment and Arrest of Ophthalmologist for 
Healthcare Fraud (Nov. 22, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/usao-
sdny/pr/manhattan-us-attorney-announces-indictment-and-arrest-
ophthalmologist-healthcare-fraud [https://perma.cc/JSD4-ZSAB]. 
43. United States ex rel. Lee v. SmithKline Beecham, Inc., 245 F.3d 1048, 
1050 (9th Cir. 2001). 
44. Id. 
45. Id. at 1053. 
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effectively derivative of an allegation that a claim is factually false 
because it seeks reimbursement for a service not provided. In a 
worthless services claim, the performance of the service is so deficient 
that for all practical purposes it is the equivalent of no performance at 
all.”46 
The theory of these cases is that the claim that was submitted to 
the government for payment overtly misrepresented what was provided, 
and was, therefore, fraudulent. These cases are not predicated on any 
non-compliance with the underlying law, although sometimes 
deficiencies that relate to the quality of services can also be attacked 
under theories of legal falsity.47 
C. Legal Falsity as Grounds for FCA Liability 
Liability under the FCA may also be predicated on a theory that 
claims for reimbursement may be “legally false.”48 Although the FCA 
is “not designed to reach every kind of fraud practiced on the 
Government,”49 it was intended to address at least some subset of claims 
that are deficient due to failure to comply with laws governing 
reimbursement. Thus, “a false claim may take many forms, the most 
common being a claim for goods or services not provided, or provided 
 
46. Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687, 703 (2d Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). 
47. In Mikes, for example, the relator (Mikes) alleged that the defendant 
medical practice had performed a diagnostic spirometry test in a sub-
standard manner. Mikes claimed that medical society guidelines set out 
the generally accepted standards for spirometry. To ensure accuracy, 
these guidelines recommend daily calibration of spirometers and 
performance of multiple trials during test administration, as well as the 
appropriate training of spirometer technicians. Id. at 694. Mikes 
maintained “that defendants’ performance of spirometry did not conform 
to the . . . guidelines and thus would yield inherently unreliable data. She 
argue[d] that defendants allowed medical assistants to perform spirometry 
tests when they were not trained in its proper administration. . . . The 
thrust of plaintiff’s qui tam suit is that the submission of Medicare 
reimbursement claims for spirometry procedures not performed in 
accordance with the relevant standard of care, that is, 
the . . . Guidelines—violates the False Claims Act” because the tests were 
not medically necessary, as required by the Act. Id. at 694, 696. 
48. See id. at 696–97. Here, the government’s case relies on the so-called 
“certification theory” of liability, or alternatively “legally false 
certification.” See id. at 696–97. Under this theory, a claim for payment 
is false when it rests on a false representation of compliance with an 
applicable federal statute, federal regulation, or contractual term. Id. at 
696. False certifications can be either express or implied. Id. at 698–99. 
Courts infer implied certifications from silence “where certification was a 
prerequisite to the government action sought.” United States ex. 
rel. Siewick v. Jamieson Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 214 F.3d 1372, 1376 (D.C. Cir. 
2000). 
49. United States v. McNinch, 356 U.S. 595, 599 (1958). 
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in violation of contract terms, specification, statute, or regulation.”50 
This latter category of false claim—claims provided in violation of 
contract terms, specification, statute, or regulation—are considered to 
be “legally false” under the theory that the government would not have 
paid the claim had the government been apprised of the alleged legal 
non-compliance. A claim is legally false, therefore, when the claimant 
has falsely certified, either impliedly or explicitly, that, in the process 
of delivering the item or service for which reimbursement is claimed, 
she complied with a statute or regulation that is a “material condition 
of payment.”51 
In the absence of an express false certification that attests to 
compliance with a particular law, as may be made in connection with 
a provider agreement or other signed document submitted to the 
government, the concept of legal falsity under the FCA relies on an 
implied false certification theory of liability.52 The implied false 
certification theory of liability posits that, by submitting a claim, a 
claimant impliedly certifies compliance with all of the reimbursing 
program’s conditions of payment.53 If in doing so, the claimant fails to 
disclose non-compliance with a violation of a statutory, regulatory, or 
contractual requirement which, had the claimant disclosed it, would 
have caused the government not to pay the claim, the claimant has 
made a misrepresentation that is false for purposes of the FCA. 
Carrying harsh (and sometimes ruinous) financial penalties, the 
FCA is designed to punish fraud, not to compensate for mere breach of 
contract.54 The core analytical problem for implied false certification 
 
50. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 9 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 
5274. 
51. Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 
1989, 1993 (2016). 
52. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Hendow v. Univ. of Phoenix, 461 F. 3d 
1166, 1172 fn. 1 (2006) (“Some courts . . . have adopted a version of the 
false certification theory whereby the certification need only be implied, 
rather than express. In those cases, if a party submits a claim for payment 
under a government program with requirements for participation, that 
claim is taken as an implied certification that the party was in compliance 
with those program requirements. See Ab-Tech Constr., Inc. v. United 
States, 31 Fed.Cl. 429, 434 (Fed.Cl.1994). Here, we need not address the 
viability of this theory, because it is beyond dispute that the University 
signed the written Program Participation Agreement, thus making an 
express statement of compliance.”). 
53. Id. 
54. The FCA provides for “a civil penalty of not less than $5,000 and not 
more than $10,000, as adjusted by the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation 
Adjustment Act of 1990 (28 U.S.C. 2461 note; Public Law 104–410 [1]), 
plus 3 times the amount of damages which the government sustains 
because of the act of that person.” 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(G) (2018). See 
also Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 784–85 
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claims has always been how to define exactly the universe of laws with 
which non-compliance could render a claim fraudulent. With respect to 
Medicare, legally false claims are often predicated on non-compliance 
with a key federal anti-abuse statute, such as the Anti-kickback Statute 
(“AKS”)55 or the Physician Self-Referral Law (the “Stark Law”).56 
Beyond non-compliance with clearly binding law, however, many FCA 
cases assert non-compliance with one of the myriad of sub-regulatory 
standards relating to how Medicare items and services are to be 
provided, documented, or billed without much consideration as to 
whether such standard is expressed in NCDs, local coverage decisions 
(“LCDs”), program manuals, training presentations, website postings, 
courses of dealing, or other sub-regulatory guidance.57 
There are numerous examples of FCA legal falsity cases alleging 
non-compliance not with the law, but, rather, with sub-regulatory 
interpretations of the law. While some of these cases evidence a concern 
that attaching such harsh penalties to sub-regulatory requirements may 
be cause for pause, they tend to gloss over the issue. For example, one 
typical case considered whether an FCA claim could be predicated on 
non-conformance in the performance of radiology services with 
standards expressed in an LCD. The court, while allowing for some 
doubt as to the significance of sub-regulatory guidance,58 concluded that 
 
(2000) (noting that damages under the FCA are “essentially punitive in 
nature,” and that the FCA’s treble damages provision “reveals an intent 
to punish past, and to deter future, unlawful conduct, not to ameliorate 
the liability of wrongdoers”). 
55. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (2018). 
56. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (2018). 
57. See, e.g., Shalala v. Guernsey Memorial Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 101 (1995) 
(designating a Medicare Manual provision as an interpretive 
rule.); Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (while it is 
true that rules found in manual such as the PRM are entitled to less 
deference than interpretations arrived at after a formal adjudication or 
notice-and-comment rulemaking, this does not mean that the rules in the 
Manual are entitled to any deference at all. If an interpretive rule is 
neither inconsistent with promulgated regulations, nor outside the 
coverage of the Act, it is valid). 
58. United States v. Space Coast Med. Associates, L.L.P., 94 F.Supp.3d 1250, 
1260 n.13 (2015) (“As for whether LCDs are rules that, upon their 
violation, can result in liability under the False Claims Act, some courts 
analyze alleged violations of LCDs as possible violations of the False 
Claims Act . . . Because these documents detail the requirements for 
payment and billing for particular procedures and are statutorily defined 
as determining coverage, 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(f)(2)(B), the Court will 
consider them as potential bases for liability in this case.”); see 
also Hericks v. Lincare Inc., No. 07-387, 2014 WL 1225660, at *10–11 
(E.D. Pa. Mar. 25, 2014) (holding that the applicable LCD did not address 
the type of conduct at issue). Other courts, however, note that LCDs are 
issued by contractors and express doubt that requirements found in these 
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if an LCD or Manual provision focuses on procedures and codes for 
billing for the services, non-conformance with LCD or Manual provision 
could form a basis for a claim alleging legal falsity, reasoning, somewhat 
tautologically, that: 
[I]n addition to statutes and regulations, LCDs—issued by private 
local entities contracting with the government set forth and 
govern the conditions of coverage and reimbursement under 
Medicare . . . . 
Relators allege that Defendants delivered radiation treatment [in 
a manner that] violated an LCD [that required certain 
documentation that was] signed by both the radiation oncologist 
and the medical physicist . . . Because this LCD focuses on 
procedures and codes for billing for the services, the Court finds 
that this documentation is a condition of payment for 
Medicare . . . . 
Relators also allege that Defendants violated an LCD by 
delivering radiation treatment prior to or without performing 
quality assurance evaluations . . . . As with [the other LCD, this 
LCD’s] requirements focus on billing and coding, so a violation of 
the determination could be an implied false certification of a 
payment condition.59 
In a very recent settlement, a genetic testing company, GenomeDx 
Biosciences Corp. (“GenomeDx”) agreed to pay $1.99 million to resolve 
allegations that it violated the FCA by submitting claims to Medicare 
for genetic tests for prostate cancer patients in violation of LCD 
requirements.60 The claimed services were fully rendered as billed, but 
 
determinations can serve as a basis for an FCA violation, especially where 
the relators did “not cite to a statute or regulation that conditions 
payment of a Medicare claim on compliance with any LCD.” United 
States ex rel. McMullen v. Ascension Health, No. 3-12-0501, 2013 WL 
6073549, at *2 n.3 (M.D. Tenn. Nov. 18, 2013). 
59. 94 F.Supp.3d 1250, at 1260–62. But cf. United States ex rel. McMullen v. 
Ascension Health, No. 3-12-0501, 2013 WL 6073549, at *2 n. 3 (M.D. 
Tenn. Nov. 18, 2013) (“Relator contends that these alleged requirements 
were found in certain ’LCDs’ . . . . Relator admits, however that the 
LCDs were issued by contractors, not by the government. Defendants 
argue that the LCDs are merely guidance, not published regulations. 
Whether the LCDs applied to Defendants is a contested factual issue, but 
Relator does not cite to a statute or regulation that conditions payment 
of a Medicare claim on compliance with any LCD.”) (citation omitted). 
See generally Chesbrough v. VPA, P.C., 655 F.3d 461 (6th Cir. 2011) 
(dismissing the Relator’s claims because they were not grounded in a 
Federal statute or regulation). 
60. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Genetic Testing Company Agrees to 
Pay $1.99 Million to Resolve Allegations of False Claims to Medicare for 
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allegedly failed to meet nuanced requirements that patients must show 
certain “risk factors” before the tests could be billed.61 These “risk 
factor” requirements were articulated not by statute or by regulation, 
nor were they articulated by CMS in sub-regulatory guidance. Instead, 
the requirements were found in an LCD.62 
These cases demonstrate how defendants have faced the risk of 
substantial FCA liability for failure to comply with requirements 
articulated in CMS sub-regulatory guidance or, as in the GenomeDX 
case, as well as the two OIG Reports, guidance issued by third-party 
contractors who administer aspects of federal healthcare programs. 
Such cases show the long reach that the theory of legal falsity bestows 
on the FCA, allowing a remarkably wide range of non-compliance with 
programmatic rules to potentially serve as a predicate for FCA 
liability.63  




62. Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 2, United States ex 





01959-00001 [https://perma.cc/Y8FJ-RKYR]. The LCD at issue 
required that patients have risk factors such as “pathological stage T2 
disease with a positive surgical margin, pathological stage T3 disease or 
rising Prostate-Specific Antigen (PSA”) levels after an initial PSA 
nadir.” See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 60. In fact, the complaint in 
this case alleges a much more complex and problematic set of facts 
involving active misrepresentation of the test conducted as something 
other than it was. See Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial, United States 
v. GenomeDx Biosciences Corp., No. 3:17-cv-01959-L-WVG (S.D. Cal. 
Sept. 26, 2017). Also, in the two OIG Reports discussed below in Section 
II.C.iii, the OIG seems to conclude that non-conformance with sub-
regulatory documentation requirements renders a payment an over-
payment, such that retention of the payment after notice of non-
compliance would constitute a “reverse” false-claim. 
63. Outside of the FCA sphere, applying traditional APA deference analysis, 
courts have typically granted HHS broad latitude in what it may require 
from providers as a precondition to payment, beyond that which is 
stipulated in statute or regulations. See, e.g., Maximum Comfort Inc. v. 
Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 512 F.3d 1081, 1083 (9th Cir. 2007). A 
typical approach is to employ the “two-step approach of Chevron, U.S.A., 
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc . . .  [under which we] 
first ask whether the Medicare Act speaks directly to the question 
presented. ‘If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter,’ 
and this Court must give effect to Congress’s expressed intent. If, on the 
other hand, the Medicare Act is silent or ambiguous with respect to the 
question presented, then this Court asks ‘whether the [Secretary’s] answer 
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II. Universal Health Care Services, Inc. v. United 
States Ex Rel. Escobar 
As recently as 2016, circuit courts disagreed as to whether, and to 
what extent, the FCA countenanced legally false claims.64 In its seminal 
opinion in Universal Health Services v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 
however, the U.S. Supreme Court confirmed that FCA cases could be 
brought under a false certification theory, putting to bed the long-
standing question of whether a claim could be false for the purposes of 
the FCA even if the claim did not factually misrepresent what was 
being billed to the government. 65 The relators in Escobar—parents of 
a teenager who died while under the care of Defendant Universal Health 
(a mental health provider) alleged that Universal Health defrauded the 
government by submitting claims for reimbursement to Medicaid for 
professional services performed by individuals who were not properly 
licensed to perform the services under Massachusetts law.66 The Court 
held that a claim may be legally false by reason of a violation of 
regulations governing the services because, in submitting the claim, the 
provider had impliedly certified that the services met CMS’s 
requirements of conformance with those regulations.67 The Court thus 
resolved a longstanding inter-circuit conflict over validity of the implied 
false certification theory of liability under which a claim may be held 
to be legally false for purposes of FCA liability.68 
Building on a number of cases that sought to distinguish mere 
breaches of contract from non-conformance that amounted to a fraud,69 
 
is based on a permissible construction of the statute.’” Id. at 1086 (citation 
omitted). If the statute is “silent or ambiguous with regard to the 
Secretary’s power to require additional information . . . . the 
interpretation of the Secretary is certainly reasonable and entitled to 
deference under Chevron.” Id. at 1088 (citation omitted).  Under this 
approach, once the requirements are accorded judicial deference, they 
serve to dispositively elucidate the underlying statutory and regulatory 
requirements, thereby requiring, in effect, compliance with the position 
expressed in the guidance. 
64. See, e.g., Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 
136 S. Ct. 1989 (2016) (and cases cited therein). 
65. Id. at 1995, 1999. 
66. Id. at 1993. 
67. Id. at 1993–94. 
68. Id. at 1998–99. 
69. See, e.g., United States v. Sci. Applications Int’l Corp., 626 F.3d 1257, 
1270–71 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“As [the defendant] SAIC compellingly points 
out, without clear limits and careful application, the implied certification 
theory is prone to abuse by the government and qui tam relators who, 
seeking to take advantage of the FCA’s generous remedial scheme, may 
attempt to turn the violation of minor contractual provisions into an FCA 
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the Escobar Court noted that a violation of any regulatory requirement 
would not necessarily render a claim legally false.70 Indeed, even a 
violation of a regulation labeled a “condition of payment” or a 
“condition of participation” in the regulatory text would not necessarily 
render a claim false.71 Rather, whether violation of a regulatory 
requirement renders a claim false under an implied false certification 
theory of liability turns on whether, in practice, the agency treated the 
requirement as material to payment.72 In other words, the relevant 
question under Escobar is whether the agency would have actually paid 
the claim had the agency realized that the regulatory requirement had 
not been met.73 Escobar’s holding means that every FCA case 
predicated on a theory of legal falsity necessitates an inquiry into 
whether or not the particular condition at issue was considered by the 
government to be material to payment. 
The Escobar Court, notably, did not place any boundaries on the 
universe of requirements that could potentially be considered material. 
The Court provides only hints as to how materiality may be established, 
relying instead on a fact-specific assessment of the particular case.74 
Thus, the Court left the essential question of all legal falsity claims—
exactly when a violation of law renders an otherwise truthful claim 
false—to be determined by lower courts with only vague guidance that 
courts should look for evidence that the law at issue was “material” to 
the federal government’s decision to pay the claim. 
 
action. In our view, however, instead of adopting a circumscribed view of 
what it means for a claim to be false or fraudulent, this very real concern 
can be effectively addressed through strict enforcement of the Act’s 
materiality and scienter requirements . . . . To establish FCA liability 
under an implied certification theory, the plaintiff must prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that compliance with the legal requirement 
in question is material to the government’s decision to pay. By enforcing 
this requirement rigorously, courts will ensure that government 
contractors will not face ‘onerous and unforeseen FCA liability’ as the 
result of noncompliance with any of ‘potentially hundreds of legal 
requirements’ established by contract. Payment requests by a contractor 
who has violated minor contractual provisions that are merely ancillary 
to the parties’ bargain are neither false nor fraudulent.”) (internal 
citations omitted). 
70. See e.g. Universal Health Servs. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. 
Ct. 1989, 1996 (2016). 
71. Id. 
72. See id. 
73. See id. The Escobar Court held that the label the government attaches 
to a requirement is relevant but not dispositive to a determination of 
materiality and the defendant’s knowledge of materiality. Id at 1995, 
2001. 
74. Id. at 2001–04. 
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A. Escobar’s Open-Ended Materiality Standard and the Unbounded 
Universe of CMS Rules and Regulations 
In determining how best to approach an implied false certification 
theory of FCA liability, The Escobar Court catalogued the approaches 
taken by circuit courts: (1) the Seventh Circuit rejected the theory 
because only express (or affirmative) falsehoods can render a claim 
“false or fraudulent” under the FCA; (2) other courts have accepted 
the theory only as to failures to disclose violations of expressly-
designated “conditions of payment;” and (3) other courts held that a 
claim could be legally false by virtue of non-compliance with an 
undefined subset of regulations that were, in practice, conditions of 
payment, though they may or may not be expressly designated as 
such.75 The Supreme Court followed the last approach, holding that 
“liability can attach when the defendant submits a claim for payment 
that makes specific representations about the goods or services 
provided, but knowingly fails to disclose the defendant’s noncompliance 
with a statutory, regulatory, or contractual requirement. In these 
circumstances, liability may attach if the omission renders those 
representations misleading.”76 
In keeping with the FCA’s statutory requirement of materiality and 
incorporating common law doctrine on the topic, the Escobar Court 
held that, in order to be actionable under the FCA, the omission must 
not only be misleading, but material: 
What matters is not the label the Government attaches to a 
requirement, but whether the defendant knowingly violated a 
requirement that the defendant knows is material to the 
government’s payment decision . . . . A misrepresentation about 
compliance with a statutory, regulatory, or contractual 
requirement must be material to the government’s payment 
decision in order to be actionable under the False Claims Act. We 
clarify below how that rigorous materiality requirement should be 
enforced.77 
 
75. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 1998–99. ”If the government contracts for health 
services and adds a requirement that contractors buy American-made 
staplers, anyone who submits a claim for those services but fails to disclose 
its use of foreign staplers violates the False Claims Act . . . . Likewise, if 
the government required contractors to aver their compliance with the 
entire U. S. Code and Code of Federal Regulations, then under this view, 
failing to mention noncompliance with any of those requirements would 
always be material. The False Claims Act does not adopt such an 
extraordinarily expansive view of liability.” Id. at 2004. 31 U.S.C. 
§ 3729(b)(4) (2018). 
76. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 1995. 
77. Id. at 1996. 
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Escobar, therefore, rejects the view “that any statutory, regulatory, 
or contractual violation is material so long as the defendant knows that 
the government would be entitled to refuse payment were it aware of 
the violation.”78 Rather, Escobar made evidence of actual materiality a 
key gatekeeper to FCA liability.79 Without the requirement of 
materiality, knowing non-conformance with any of the myriad 
statutory, regulatory, and contractual requirements imposed by federal 
health care programs would give rise to FCA liability.80 
Nevertheless, the Court did not articulate an objective test for 
materiality, but instead recommended a fact-based, case-by-case 
approach to determining materiality. The Court explained that any 
evidence of how the government treats a requirement, in practice, is 
relevant to a determination of materiality: 
[T]he term ‘material’ means having a natural tendency to 
influence, or be capable of influencing, the payment or receipt of 
money or property . . . . The materiality standard is demanding. 
The False Claims Act is not “an all-purpose antifraud statute,” 
or a vehicle for punishing garden-variety breaches of contract or 
regulatory violations. A misrepresentation cannot be deemed 
material merely because the Government designates compliance 
with a particular statutory, regulatory, or contractual 
requirement as a condition of payment. Nor is it sufficient for a 
finding of materiality that the Government would have the option 
to decline to pay if it knew of the defendant’s noncompliance. 
Materiality, in addition, cannot be found where noncompliance is 
minor or insubstantial . . . . [P]roof of materiality can include, but 
is not necessarily limited to, evidence that the defendant knows 
that the Government consistently refuses to pay claims in the 
mine run of cases based on noncompliance with the particular 
statutory, regulatory, or contractual requirement. Conversely, if 
the government pays a particular claim in full despite its actual 
knowledge that certain requirements were violated, that is very 
strong evidence that those requirements are not material. Or, if 
the Government regularly pays a particular type of claim in full 
despite actual knowledge that certain requirements were violated, 
and has signaled no change in position, that is strong evidence 
that the requirements are not material.81 
 
78. Id. at 2004. 
79. Id. at 2001–02. 
80. Id. at 2003. 
81. Id. at 2002–04 (internal citations omitted). In a footnote, the Court 
states: “We reject Universal Health’s assertion that materiality is too fact 
intensive for courts to dismiss False Claims Act cases on a motion to 
dismiss or at summary judgment. The standard for materiality that we 
have outlined is a familiar and rigorous one.” Id. at 2004, n.6. 
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Under this approach, materiality is not to be judged solely by 
reference to what the government says is material, but rather by what 
the government treats as material in practice. While this limitation is 
important to keep FCA liability from extending to such clearly-
ancillary requirements, as the Court put it, that all healthcare providers 
“buy American-made staplers,”82 it also places healthcare providers in 
the precarious position of being unable to conclusively rely on the 
government’s explicit designation of a standard as material, or to 
conclude that in the absence of such a designation, a standard is 
immaterial. While the Court considered the risk of predictability posed 
by such a contextual materiality standard, as discussed in detail herein, 
the Court assumed that the FCA’s scienter requirement would do the 
work of limiting the set of requirements to which FCA liability may 
attach.83 The Court acknowledged that the defendant’s knowledge of 
the government’s view that a standard is material is critical and cannot 
be assumed.84 
 
82. Id. at 2004. 
83. Id. at 2002. 
84. Id. at 2003–04. Of course, evidence of materiality (e.g., historical non-
payment or government statements) will often serve as evidence of 
knowledge. Even cases alleging violations of significant anti-fraud 
statutes, such as Stark or the AKS as the source of legal falsity, must also 
address the question of whether or not the deviation is 
material. One court concluded that there had been a violation of Stark 
because the parties had failed to comply with a requirement in Stark that 
certain arrangements be memorialized in writing, and then turned to 
considering whether the violation was material for purposes of the FCA; 
it held: 
Applying the Escobar factors to the instant case, it is clear that 
the alleged violations at issue here are material. As an initial 
matter, the Stark Act expressly prohibits Medicare from paying 
claims that do not satisfy each of its requirements, including every 
element of any applicable exception. The relevant exceptions 
expressly require that any financial arrangements that would 
otherwise violate the Stark Act must be set forth in writing. 
Although “statutory, regulatory, and contractual requirements 
are not automatically material, even if they are labeled conditions 
of payment,” they nevertheless represent “relevant” evidence in 
favor of materiality. 
Compliance with the writing requirement permits a reviewer to 
analyze the timeframe, rate of compensation, and the identifiable 
services contemplated in the arrangement to determine whether 
any portion is based on the volume or value of physician referrals. 
CMS guidance also requires a signature as a manifestation of the 
parties’ assent to the arrangement, a requirement that “plays a 
role in preventing fraud and abuse.” These requirements go to the 
very “essence of the bargain” between the government and health 
care providers with respect to Stark Act compliance. 
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In the wake of Escobar, the newly-articulated materiality 
requirement was widely viewed as providing a workable limitation on 
the scope of FCA liability.85 The court in Ruckh v. CMC II LLC et al. 
described Escobar as: “reject[ing] a system of government traps, zaps, 
and zingers that permits the government to retain the benefit of a 
substantially conforming good or service but to recover the price 
entirely—multiplied by three—because of some immaterial contractual 
or regulatory non-compliance.”86 The Ruckh court noted that the FCA, 
instead, “requires proof that a vendor committed some non-compliance 
that resulted in a material deviation in the value received and requires 
proof that the deviation would materially and adversely affect the 
buyer’s willingness to pay.”87 In practice, however, divining the 
government’s mindset vis a vis payment has involved a fair amount of 
speculation, causing the post-Escobar experience with respect to federal 
healthcare reimbursement to fail to meet expectations of increased 
consistency, predictability, and simplicity.88 Fundamentally, an 
approach to assessing legal falsity that does not provide any clear 
limitations on the universe of programmatic requirements that could 
form the basis of an FCA suit does not properly account for the fact 
that “Medicare is a massive federal program, ‘embodied in hundreds of 
pages of statutes and thousands of pages of often interrelated 
regulations.’ . . . [T]he agency has issued tens of thousands of pages of 
Manual instructions, interpretive rules, and other guidance 
 
On balance, a reasonable jury could find that the materiality 
requirement of the FCA is satisfied in the instant case. The 
writing requirements contained in several Stark Act exceptions 
are important, mandatory, and material to the government’s 
payment decisions. 
 United States ex rel. Emanuele v. Medicor Ass’n, 242 F. Supp.3d 409, 
431–32 (W.D. Pa. 2017) (internal citations omitted). 
85. United States ex rel. Ruckh v. Salus Rehab, L.L.C., 304 F. Supp. 3d 1258, 
1268 (M.D. Fla. 2018); Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP & 
Affiliates, Escobar and the Implied Certification Theory: Initial Cases 
Raise the Bar on Materiality in False Claims Act 
Litigation, SKADDEN (Nov. 7, 2016), www.skadden.com/insights/
publiactions/2016/11/emescobarem-and-the-implied-certification-theory-
i [https://perma.cc/R7X4-SMWV]; G. Christian Roux & John D. 
Hanover, Implied False Certification Liability Under the False Claims 
Act: How the Materiality Standard Offers Protection After 
Escobar, 38 CONSTRUCTION LAW. 16, 21 (2018); but cf., C. Joel Van Over 
et al., Client Alert: Supreme Court Validates ‘Implied Certification’ 




86. Ruckh, 304 F. Supp. 3d at 1263. 
87. Id. 
88. See infra Section II.C. 
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documents.”89 In articulating a standard that hinges on highly 
contextual and individualized assessments of programmatic rules, the 
Supreme Court failed, moreover, to recognize the fundamental nature 
of the health care industry, which operates on a system of adherence to 
tacit industry standards, not all of which have legal import. 
The Escobar Court, consequently (and potentially inadvertently) 
made it possible that non-compliance with an indefinite universe of 
requirements, ranging from esoteric and technical billing instructions to 
qualitative standards of professional conduct, could render a claim 
fraudulent. Indeed, FCA cases have gone beyond use of sub-regulatory 
guidance as evidence of materiality, allowing requirements contained in 
sub-regulatory guidance to be treated as potentially material to 
payment in and of themselves.90 After all, the Escobar Court construed 
only the question of non-conformance with a properly-adopted 
regulation. Escobar has left, in its wake, a glut of inconsistent case law 
that attempts to divine whether CMS would or would not have paid a 
claim had it known that a given requirement had not been met. This 
lack of consistency has left whistleblowers, prosecutors, and health care 
providers, alike, to guess as to where the line exists between a technical 
foot fault and a fraudulent claim.91 
C. Scienter as a Failed Check on the Limitations of Escobar’s Materiality 
Standard 
While the Escobar Court entertained the possibility that its open-
ended approach to analyzing legal falsity could sweep too broadly, the 
Court ultimately dismissed it, stating that the FCA’s scienter 
requirement would reduce the risks posed by the unpredictability of a 
subjective materiality standard: 
[O]ther parts of the False Claims Act allay Universal Health’s 
concerns [that the standard was too broad]. “[I]nstead of adopting 
a circumscribed view of what it means for a claim to be false or 
fraudulent,” concerns about fair notice and open-ended liability 
 
89. Allina, 139 S. Ct. at 1821–22 (2019) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
90. See, e.g., supra notes 46–53 and accompanying text; United States ex 
rel. Prather v. Brookdale Senior Living Communities, Inc., 838 F.3d 750, 
773–74 (6th Cir. 2016). 
91. This ambiguity is only exacerbated in an enforcement scheme that relies 
almost exclusively on whistleblowers who may be inspired by 
opportunism, overly vigilant, or simply lacking in regulatory insights, so 
that prosecutorial discretion is not a regulating feature. The Medicare 
regulatory scheme is, moreover, so complex that courts are ill-equipped to 
navigate and understand Medicare requirements and to serve as effective 
gatekeepers for FCA claims, making it difficult for whistleblowers and 
defendants alike to predict where a court may land. 
Health Matrix·Volume 31·2021 
Applying Allina to the World of Escobar 
177 
“can be effectively addressed through strict enforcement of the 
Act’s materiality and scienter requirements.”92 
The Court, therefore, anticipated that the scienter and materiality 
requirements of the FCA would serve as dual gates to FCA liability by 
separating inconsequential deviations from law from fraudulent 
deviations from law. 
The requirement of scienter means that, in order to succeed on a 
claim under the FCA, a relator must show that the defendant acted 
“knowingly,” which the FCA defines as either “actual knowledge,” 
“deliberate ignorance,” or “reckless disregard.”93 “The False Claims Act 
does not create liability merely for a health care provider’s disregard of 
government regulations or improper internal policies unless, as a result 
of such acts, the provider knowingly asks the government to pay 
amounts it does not owe. Accordingly, the fact that there may have 
been a violation of the laws governing Medicare . . . is not enough, 
standing alone, to sustain a cause of action under the False Claims 
Act.”94 In FCA claims alleging legal falsity, this means that the relator 
must show that the defendant knew: 1) that she had not met the legal 
requirement at issue, and 2) that the government would not have paid 
the claim had the government known that the requirement was not 
met.95 With respect to the scienter requirement carried by the FCA, 
“Congress did not intend to turn the False Claims Act, a law designed 
to punish and deter fraud, into a vehicle either punishing honest 
mistakes or incorrect claims submitted through mere negligence or 
imposing a burdensome obligation on government contractors rather 
than a limited duty to inquire.”96 
 
92. Universal Health Servs. Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 
1989, 2002 (internal citations omitted). 
93. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b) (2018). “Specific intent to defraud is not required; 
however, liability does not attach to innocent mistakes or simple 
negligence.” Id. § 3729(b). 
94. United States ex rel. Phalp v. Lincare Holdings, Inc., 857 F.3d 1148, 
1154–56 (11th Cir. 2017) (citations omitted). 
95. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Purcell v. MWI Corp., 807 F.3d 281 (D.C. 
Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 625 (2017). The False Claims Act 
prohibits the knowing presentation of false claims for government 
payment or approval. Id. at 287. The Act defines “knowing” and 
“knowingly” to mean that the actor had actual knowledge of the pertinent 
information and acted in deliberate ignorance or in reckless disregard of 
the truth or falsity of that information. Id. The question on intent here is 
whether the defendants knew (or would have known absent deliberate 
blindness or reckless disregard) that their bills would lead the government 
to believe that they had provided services that they actually did not 
provide. Id. at 290. See also Minnesota Ass’n of Nurse Anesthetists v. 
Allina, 276 F.3d 1032 (8th Cir. 2002); United States v. Peter Mackby, 261 
F.3d 821 (9th Cir. 2001). 
96. Phalp, 857 F.3d at 1155. 
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While the Escobar Court envisioned that scienter would serve a key 
role in separating appropriate from overzealous FCA suits, post-
Escobar, lower courts have struggled to apply this screen effectively 
and consistently.97 One of the most confounding factors in legal falsity 
cases is that they are often predicated on assertions that the defendant 
has deviated from standards that are inherently ambiguous both as to 
meaning and as to whether or not the government considers them to be 
material.98 Evaluating scienter in the face of ambiguous standards with 
uncertain import is challenging and has led to disparate approaches and 
results. 
The Eleventh Circuit, for example, rejected the argument that 
ambiguity in meaning categorically precludes a finding that defendants 
acted “knowingly” as a matter of law.99 It held that: “Although 
ambiguity may be relevant to the scienter analysis, it does not foreclose 
a finding of scienter. Instead, a court must determine whether the 
defendant actually knew or should have known that its conduct violated 
a regulation in light of any ambiguity at the time of the alleged 
violation.”100 However, the Eleventh Circuit did not elucidate the 
standards used to evaluate the degree of tolerable ambiguity in 
meaning, nor the evidence that would be relevant to such an inquiry, 
and the problem in identifying these standards seems even more 
difficult if one extends the analysis to the question of knowledge of 
materiality, which, as we have noted, will often be extremely unclear. 
The Eighth Circuit has considered what this evidence might look 
like, ultimately holding that none of the evidence produced by the 
relator in the case at hand, nor the existence of an evident ambiguity 
in the standard alleged to have been violated, meant that the 
defendants knew that they were submitting false claims.101 The court 
held that in answering the question of whether a FCA defendant’s 
“reasonable interpretation of the ambiguous regulation precludes a 
finding that it knowingly submitted false or fraudulent claims” 
“evidence of government guidance that warned a regulated defendant 
away from an otherwise reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous 
regulation. . . . (such as) a Medicare agency memorandum (that) made 
it clear that anesthesiologists were not to leave a patient during a 
personally performed procedure” could support a finding of scienter.102 
 




101. United States ex rel. Donegan v. Anesthesia Ass’n. of Kansas 
City, PC, 833 F.3d 874, 875 (8th Cir. 2016); see also United States ex 
rel. Hixson v. Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 613 F.3d 1186, 1190 (8th Cir. 
2010). 
102. Donegan, 833 F.3d at 879–80. 
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However, the court held that a report prepared “by a former Section 
Chief of CMS’s predecessor . . . nearly two decades ago by a former 
agency official in another case is not the kind of official government 
warning that would be sufficient evidence of reckless disregard”.103 
Further, the court held that the defendant did not have a duty to ask 
CMS or its local contractors whether its interpretation of the 
ambiguous terminology was proper, as “the agency had not clarified an 
obvious ambiguity in its . . . regulation for decades, (the 
defendant’s) . . . ’failure to obtain a legal opinion or prior [CMS] 
approval cannot support a finding of recklessness.’” 104 
Underscoring the difficulty of relying on whether or not the 
defendant has been “warned away” from a particular interpretation as 
a definitive standard, another court held that in the face of ambiguity, 
a credible alternative interpretation negated scienter, even where an 
agent of a state Medicaid agency informed the defendant that it had 
billed the state for amounts to which it was not ultimately entitled 
because of a regulation excluding the particular class of providers from 
eligibility for the claimed payment.105 The Court held that the civil 
servant’s interpretation of the regulation did not put the defendant on 
notice that the defendant had received an overpayment, and that the 
defendant, therefore, did not have an overpayment liability until it 
received formal notice of its obligation to repay the claim.106 This meant 
that it had no reverse FCA liability for failing to return the payment 
prior to receipt of such notice.107 In so holding, the Court explained that 
in order for the relator to prevail in an assertion that the defendant 
knew of the overpayment, the relator “must show that there is no 
reasonable interpretation of the law that would make the allegedly false 
statement true.”108 Similarly, another court explained that if a 
defendant’s determination that the defendant does not have 
overpayment liability is “based on a reasonable interpretation of a 
statute,” failure to return payment: 
cannot support a claim under the FCA if there is no authoritative 
contrary interpretation of that statute. That is because the 
defendant in such a case could not have acted with the knowledge 
that the FCA requires before liability can attach . . . . It is hard 
to see how [the relators] could . . . have satisfied even the loosest 
standard of knowledge [under the FCA], i.e., acting in reckless 
 
103. Id. at 880. 
104. Id. 
105. Olson v. Fairview Health Servs. of Minnesota, 831 F.3d 1063, 1070–
71 (8th Cir. 2016). 
106. See id. at 1074. 
107. Id. 
108. Id. at 1070 (emphasis added). 
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disregard of the truth or falsity of the information, when the 
relevant legal question was unresolved. And we agree with the 
Ninth Circuit’s holding that a defendant does not act with the 
requisite deliberate ignorance or reckless disregard by tak[ing] 
advantage of a disputed legal question.109 
In these cases, the defendant has succeeded in arguing that an 
inability to trust the government’s own statements as current or 
definitively correct precludes the defendant from having the requisite 
scienter. If this approach was to be applied fully and consistently, it 
would seem that defendants would seldom be seen as having the 
requisite scienter. Recognizing this problem, other courts have taken a 
different approach, explaining that this type of approach: 
would put an impossible burden on the drafters of statutes, 
regulations, and government contracts to avoid all potential 
ambiguity in order to prevent intentional fraud against the 
government; it would incentivize the intentional twisting of 
language in order to find profitable erroneous interpretations of 
the controlling text, even though all those subject to the text were 
well-aware of its intended meaning.110 
Given that many CMS requirements can be construed as 
ambiguous, at least to some degree, we are left with a widespread failure 
to identify what objective facts (e.g., what guidance, from whom) 
indicate the government’s subjective determination of materiality with 
sufficient clarity and authority to put a defendant on notice that a 
requirement is, indeed, material. What has emerged, therefore, is a 
messy and inconsistent body of case law that is out of touch with the 
reality of the health care industry’s experience with Medicare’s 
programmatic rules and leaves both relators and defendants with little 
predictability as to whether a claim will succeed. 
D. (Mis)Application of Escobar’s Materiality Standard in Healthcare 
FCA Cases 
1. Courts Struggle to Assess Evidence of Materiality 
In post-Escobar FCA cases, the question arises of how the 
government or a relator will demonstrate that a given requirement was 
material to payment. Courts applying Escobar to the plethora of 
statutes, regulations, and sub-regulatory guidance that govern federal 
 
109. United States ex rel. Chilcott v. KBR, Inc., No. 09-CV-4018, 2013 WL 
5781660, at *1 (C.D. Ill. Oct. 25, 2013); Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 
551 U.S. 47, 70 n.20 (2007) (when “the statutory text and relevant court 
and agency guidance allow for more than one reasonable interpretation, 
it would defy history and current thinking to treat a defendant who 
merely adopts one such interpretation as a knowing or reckless violator.”). 
110. Chilcott, 2013 WL 5781660, at *7. 
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healthcare reimbursement have had difficulty identifying compelling 
evidence of materiality.111 The focus seems, by and large, to be on the 
government’s behavior with respect to other instances of the same or 
similar non-compliance.112 This opens up the question of what and 
whose behavior is relevant. When courts have settled on particular 
instances of behavior as indicators of materiality, it is apparent they 
often have been unable to interpret the government’s behavior 
correctly, attaching undue significance to ancillary, technical 
requirements, while failing to recognize the import of requirements that 
go to the heart of the value of the items or services billed. 
This struggle originates from the fact that Escobar applies common-
law fraud principles that are designed to assess an individual’s likely 
state of mind regarding claims involving complex government agencies. 
Traditional approaches to establishing materiality for purposes of a 
common law fraud rely essentially on the fact finder’s subjective 
determination of what the defendant knew, or should have known, 
about the wronged party’s state of mind.113 This inquiry becomes mind-
bogglingly abstract where the wronged party is the government. CMS 
employs 6,000 individuals across sixteen offices, six centers, and three 
consortia.114 To administer the Medicare program alone, CMS contracts 
with sixteen independent Medicare Administrative Contractors to 
adjudicate Medicare claims, each of which employs thousands of 
employees.115 CMS also contracts with state agencies to perform certain 
functions, including surveying providers to determine whether they 
meet the requirements for participation in CMS programs.116 CMS 
publishes four paper-based Manuals and twenty-five internet-based 
Manuals, each hundreds (if not thousands) of pages in length, that 
articulate requirements and guidelines for CMS reimbursement, ranging 
from technical requirements for online claims submission to rules 
 
111. See cases discussed in this Section II.C. 
112. See, e.g., United States v. Brookdale Senior Living Communities, Inc., 
892 F.3d 822, 831–4 (6th Cir. 2018); Ruckh, 304 F. Supp. 3d at 1260–
61; United States ex rel. Harman v. Trinity Indus. Inc., 872 F.3d 645, 
661–63 (5th Cir. 2017); United States v. Sanford-Brown, Ltd., 840 F.3d 
445, 447–8 (7th Cir. 2016). 
113. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 1999–2000. 




115. What is a MAC, CMS.GOV. (Oct. 26, 2017), https://www.cms.gov/
Medicare/Medicare-Contracting/Medicare-Administrative-Contractors/
What-is-a-MAC [https://perma.cc/X94D-K5H5]. 
116. CTR. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERV., STATE OPERATIONS 
MANUAL, Pub. No. 100-07, Ch. 1 (Rev. Oct. 3, 2014) 
[https://perma.cc/E9J5-UWY4]. 
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against patient abuse.117 The Manuals are continuously updated and 
clarified through hundreds of annual transmittals.118 CMS also issues 
numerous FAQs, training materials, letters, and memoranda that 
clarify requirements, and, in some cases, create new requirements.119 
When reimbursement requirements are clearly articulated, the 
application of such rules is often a matter of degree, with different CMS 
decision-makers drawing nuanced, and sometimes conflicting, decisions 
as to the line at which the frequency or pervasiveness of noncompliance 
becomes significant. It comes as little surprise, therefore, that courts 
have struggled to identify which requirements the collective CMS 
subjectively views as material. 
The inability of courts to ascribe a mindset to CMS has contributed 
to, if not driven, the inconsistent and unpredictable outcomes of 
healthcare FCA cases. Take, for instance, the question of whether a 
rule can be considered material for FCA purposes if CMS continues to 
pay claims, despite knowledge that the rule has been violated. In one 
post-Escobar case, the court came to the seemingly intuitive conclusion 
that the fact that the government had continued to pay claims despite 
knowledge of regulatory non-compliance was essentially dispositive as 
to the issue of materiality.120 In addressing a nursing home’s failure to 
adhere to the regulatory requirement that plans of care be maintained 
for patients, the court concluded that there was a lack of evidence that 
the government considered the non-conformance material: 
[O]ne might expect evidence of whether record-keeping 
deficiencies have resulted in the sudden and indefinite 
discontinuation of payment to providers of health care 
services . . . evidence of whether governments are content—
assisted by a regime of rigorous and regular inspections, audits, 
and accounting— to permit record-keeping practices that largely 
achieve the ends of, but differ from, the prescribed record-keeping; 
or evidence otherwise establishing the historical response of 
government to a long-standing non-compliance by a large 
 
117. Manuals, CMS.GOV (May 28, 2019), https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-
and-Guidance/Guidance/Manuals/index?redirect=/Manuals 
[https://perma.cc/X8Q4-5XQ2]. 
118. See Transmittals, CMS.GOV. (Dec. 31, 2019), https://www.cms.gov/
Regulations-andGuidance/Guidance/Transmittals 
[https://perma.cc/4VDX-JYVU]. 
119. CMS FAQs and other documents are generally found on the CMS website, 
organized by subject. FAQs and presentations may be linked at the 
bottom of topic-specific pages. See Regulations & Guidance, 
CMS.GOV, https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Regulations
-and-Guidance [https://perma.cc/PQ8E-XGYA] (linking to numerous 
subpages by “provider type” or “special topic,” each containing links to 
additional guidance). 
120. Ruckh, 304 F. Supp. 3d at 1261. 
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provider of services in a pervasively regulated and monitored 
industry . . . 121 
In the absence of such evidence, the court held that it appeared 
“that the federal and state government regard the disputed practices 
with leniency or tolerance or indifference or perhaps with resignation to 
the colossal difficulty of precise, pervasive, ponderous, and permanent 
record-keeping in the pertinent clinical environment.”122 Indeed, even 
though the government knew about the alleged violations, “evidence 
shows not a single threat of non-payment, not a single complaint or 
demand, and not a single resort to an administrative remedy or other 
sanction for the same practices that result in the enormous verdict at 
issue.”123 In that context, the court noted, even if the requirement could 
be considered material, “establishing the defendants’ knowledge of 
materiality seems at least impractical, if not impossible.”124 Under this 
approach, continued payment in the face of knowledge of non-
compliance appears to be essentially dispositive evidence of the lack of 
materiality, if not also to the scienter of the defendant.125 
Other cases, however, have taken a different position, holding that 
continued payment in the face of apparent knowledge is not dispositive 
as to the issue of materiality and implying that continued payment may 
simply be indicative of a lack of knowledge on the part of the “right 
parties.”126 For example, a recent Fifth Circuit case acknowledged that 
continued payment by their government may be probative, but 
ultimately that “there are and must be boundaries to government 
tolerance of a supplier’s failure to abide by its rules.”127 Citing a Ninth 
Circuit opinion, the court held that “questions of materiality remained 
even where the . . . [agency] had continued to pay.”128 
 
121. Id. at 1264. 
122. Id. at 1260. 
123. Id. at 1260–61. 
124. Id. at 1261. 
125. Also, notable is the specter raised by this Court that non-payment may 
be too radical a response to minor infractions and, even if warranted, that 
it may be an impractical response because of the effect that non-payment 
could have on the availability of services to beneficiaries. 
126. See infra, notes 130–31. 
127. United States ex rel. Harman v. Trinity Indus. Inc., 872 F.3d 645, 664 
(5th Cir. 2017). 
128. Id. at 664. The observation that the FDA pays for claims is an error and 
raises a significant issue. Campie dealt with CMS payment for a drug 
approved by the FDA under allegedly-false pretenses. This error is typical 
of the confusion that courts have in dealing with Medicare and Medicaid-
related issues. Even the Campie court seems not to have fully grasped, or 
at least not to have grappled with, the question of whether knowledge on 
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In another post-Escobar case, the court held that the fact that the 
relators had alleged that HHS OIG prosecutors had taken criminal and 
civil enforcement actions against providers who engaged in similar 
conduct was sufficient to raise a reasonable inference that CMS would 
deny payment if it knew about defendants’ alleged violations.129 In that 
case, the relators alleged that the defendants had submitted claims for 
services that were not reimbursable because they lacked required 
physician certifications.130 The relators cited, and the court found 
persuasive, enforcement actions taken by prosecutors against other 
providers as evidence that certain physician certification requirements 
were material to CMS’s decision to pay a claim.131 In yet another post-
Escobar case, the court explained that the Fifth Circuit’s “approach to 
materiality” is that “the FCA requires proof only that the defendant’s 
false statements ‘could have’ influenced the government’s pay decision 
or had the ‘potential’ to influence the government’s decision, not that 
the false statements actually did so.”132 
In the absence of any allegation that the government knew about a 
defect, or where the reviewing court does not accept payment or non-
payment in the face of knowledge as dispositive, other factors can come 
into play and the analysis becomes even more complex and 
unpredictable. For example, in the context of a motion to dismiss, the 
Sixth Circuit engaged in a holistic analysis where no one factor was 
dispositive.133 Specifically, in determining the materiality of a regulatory 
 
the part of one government agency (FDA) can be attributed to another 
(CMS), for purposes of discerning materiality. As stated by the Relator, 
its theory “of liability is that Gilead defrauded the FDA into approving 
the use of Synthetics China. The complaint alleges that out of three 
validation lots, two were hopelessly contaminated. There is no reasonable 
prospect that, had Gilead disclosed the actual test results, the FDA would 
have approved a facility so incapable of producing acceptable product. No 
allegation in the complaint suggests otherwise. Without this fraud, every 
pill containing FTC from Synthetics China would not have conformed to 
the NDA and thus would have been ineligible for reimbursement.” Brief 
in Opposition at 15, Gilead Sciences, Inc. v. United States ex rel Campie, 
139 S. Ct. 783 (2019) (No. 17-936). But, of course, FDA does not make 
reimbursement decisions; CMS does, so the relevant question is not 
whether FDA kept paying in the face of its knowledge of the problem, but 
whether CMS even knew about this issue. 
129. United States ex rel. Lemon v. Nurses to Go, Inc., 924 F.3d 155, 162 (5th 
Cir. 2019). 
130. Id. at 161. 
131. Id. at 162. 
132. Trinity Indus. Inc., 872 F.3d at 661. 
133. United States v. Brookdale Senior Living Communities, Inc., 892 F.3d 
822, 831 (6th Cir. 2018). The court explained as follows: 
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requirement related to home health services, the court endeavored to 
determine whether the requirement went to the “essence of the bargain” 
between the parties.134 In furtherance of this analysis, the court cited 
guidance documents that underscored the importance of the standard 
at issue, including documents that were not in effect at the time that 
the defendant provided or billed for the services, as evidence of the 
materiality of the requirement.135 The court also dismissed as not 
probative of the question of materiality the government’s decision not 
to intervene in the case (i.e., to allow the whistleblower to proceed with 
the case without the government’s involvement).136 Lost in the vast and 
 
“[A] misrepresentation about compliance with a statutory, 
regulatory, or contractual requirement must be material to the 
Government’s payment decision in order to be actionable under 
the False Claims Act.” Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2002. The Act 
defines “material” as “having a natural tendency to influence, or 
be capable of influencing, the payment or receipt of money or 
property.” 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(4). In Escobar, the Supreme Court 
clarified this materiality requirement and emphasized that the 
“standard is demanding.” 136 S. Ct. at 2003. “[M]ateriality ‘look[s] 
to the effect on the likely or actual behavior of the recipient of the 
alleged misrepresentation.’“ Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2002 (second 
alteration in original) (quoting 26 SAMUEL WILLISTON & 
RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
CONTRACTS § 69:12 (4th ed. 2003)). Something is material if a 
reasonable person “would attach importance to [it] in determining 
his choice of action in the transaction” or “if the defendant knew 
or had reason to know that the recipient of the representation 
attaches importance to the specific matter ‘in determining his 
choice of action,’ even though a reasonable person would not.” Id. 
at 2002–03 (alteration in original) (quoting RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 538 (AM. LAW INST. 1977)). The 
analysis of materiality is “holistic.” United States ex rel. Escobar 
v. Universal Health Servs., Inc., 842 F.3d 103, 109 (1st Cir. 2016). 
Relevant factors include: (1) “the Government’s decision to 
expressly identify a provision as a condition of payment”; (2) 
whether “the Government consistently refuses to pay claims in 
the mine run of cases based on noncompliance with the particular 
statutory, regulatory, or contractual requirement” or if, with 
actual knowledge of the non-compliance, it consistently pays such 
claims and there is no indication that its practice will change; and 
(3) whether the “noncompliance is minor or insubstantial” or if it 
goes “to the very essence of the bargain.” Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 
2003 & n.5. None of these considerations is dispositive alone, nor 
is the list exclusive. 
 Id. at 2001–04. 
134. Id. 
135. Id. at 835–36. 
136. Id. at 836. A pre-Escobar case that sought to establish materiality is also 
instructive and suggests that establishing materiality may require 
 
Health Matrix·Volume 31·2021 
Applying Allina to the World of Escobar 
186 
ever-changing wilderness of CMS guidance, the Sixth Circuit appears 
to have assigned weight to government action (or inaction) at random, 
ultimately holding the defendant responsible for divining a state of 
mind that the government itself had not yet fully expressed. 
2. Impossibility of Assessing the Government’s State of Mind 
These decisions add little to our understanding of materiality. 
Rather, they underscore the impossibility of understanding the 
intention of the multi-headed hydra that is the government. Trying to 
divine the government’s state of mind is problematic. Other than 
through properly-adopted law, the government does not speak with one 
voice or act with a unitary objective. Escobar requires that we do not 
automatically give deference to a law’s own statement that it is a 
condition of payment, but that we instead must look elsewhere for 
evidence of materiality—but it does not tell us where to look. 
The mind of the “reasonable man” is knowable with reference to 
our shared experience as humans, in a way that the government’s “state 
of mind,” if it can be said to have one, is not. By way of analogy: the 
law has long struggled with how to ascertain the state of mind of 
corporations, such that they can be said to knowingly engage in 
securities fraud misrepresentation, with the Circuits advancing a 
number of different theories as to how it can be assessed.137 Ultimately, 
these theories, not surprisingly, all concentrate on assessing the mindset 
of a particular corporate actor.138 With regard to securities fraud, for 
example, some courts focus on the scienter of the particular corporate 
official or officials who make or issue the statement, disregarding the 
state of mind of other corporate agents, holding, for example, that 
 
testimony from suitable agency representatives to the effect that the 
standard is material. In that case, the court explained: 
In this case . . . record evidence could have allowed the jury to 
conclude that the contract’s conflict of interest provisions were far 
from minor . . . ’[n]umerous witness[es] from both the NRC and 
SAIC testified that the [organizational conflict of interest] 
obligations in SAIC’s contracts with the NRC were important to 
the overall purpose of the contract.’ NRC contracting officers and 
specialists also testified that had they been aware of SAIC’s 
apparent or actual conflicts, such as its relationships with British 
Nuclear and Bechtel Jacobs, they would not have awarded the 
two contracts, nor would they have made payments under those 
contracts. 
 United States v. Sci. Applications Int’l Corp., 626 F.3d 1257, 1271 (D.C. 
Cir. 2010). 
137. See, e.g., In re Omnicare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 769 F.3d 455, 473 (6th Cir. 
2014) (explaining that “state of mind” analysis is more complicated when 
the defendant is a corporation). 
138. See id. 
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person must know of the falsity of the statement she makes.139 Other 
courts have allowed the statement to be considered false when it 
appears that corporate officials must have known that the statements 
were false, even where the person speaking them did not.140 Regardless 
of the approach taken, the objective ultimately becomes (in many cases, 
out of necessity) to ascertain the subjective state of mind of a living 
person with authority to represent the corporate will. 
Notably, in securities fraud cases, the task is simpler, as the alleged 
misrepresentation is a clear affirmative act manifesting a specific 
position (and not just the routine act of payment or non-payment, 
where the reasons for the decision may not be evident). There is, 
moreover, some consensus between courts as to who has authority to 
speak on behalf of the corporation (likely those individuals who control 
the corporation, such as executives, the board of directors, or majority 
 
139. In re Apple Computer, Inc. Sec. Litig., 243 F. Supp.2d 1012, 1023 (N.D. 
Cal. 2002), aff’d 127 Fed. Appx. 296 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Nordstrom v. 
Chubb & Son, 54 F.3d 1424, 1435–36 (9th Cir. 1995)). 
140. Joseph M. McLaughlin, Corporate Litigation: Pleading Corporate 
Scienter: Circuits Split on Standard, SIMPSON THACHER 1-
2 (2014), http://www.stblaw.com/docs/default-source/Publications/ny-
law-journal_joe-mclaughlin_corporate-litigation-column_12_11_
2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/WP2V-T5Y8]. As one commenter explained:  
In adopting this respondeat superior approach to corporate 
scienter, the Fifth Circuit . . . explained that its view is consistent 
with the common law rule that “where, as in fraud, an essentially 
subjective state of mind is an element of a cause of action also 
involving some sort of conduct, such as a misrepresentation, the 
required state of mind must actually exist in the individual 
making (or being a cause of the making of) the misrepresentation, 
and may not simply be imputed to that individual on general 
principles of agency”. . . . The Fifth Circuit explicitly rejected the 
notion that corporate scienter could stem from the “collective 
knowledge [of the corporation’s agents] . . . ” where no identified 
individual possessed the requisite state of mind . . . . In contrast, 
the Second, Seventh and Ninth Circuits have each 
adopted . . . [the view that it is sufficient that the facts] creat[e] 
a strong inference that someone whose intent could be imputed to 
the corporation acted with the requisite scienter. . . . The U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit [explained] . . . that “it 
is possible to draw a strong inference of corporate scienter without 
being able to name the individuals who concocted and 
disseminated the fraud.” To illustrate the point, the court posited 
a stark hypothetical: If General Motors announced that it sold one 
million SUVs in a particular year when the actual number was 
zero, “[t]here would be a strong inference of corporate scienter, 
since so dramatic an announcement would have been approved by 
corporate officials sufficiently knowledgeable about the company 
to know that the announcement was false.” 
 Id. 
Health Matrix·Volume 31·2021 
Applying Allina to the World of Escobar 
188 
owners). Most fundamentally, we do not know, who, post-Escobar, has 
the authority to speak for the government. 
The conundrum of ascribing a unified and knowable state of mind 
to the government may have led to the apparent reliance of Escobar 
and its progeny on payment decisions as indicators of materiality. 
However, the fact that courts have failed to treat with meaningful 
consistency the government’s decision to act, or not to act, to pay or 
recoup payment in the face of knowledge of non-compliance only further 
highlights that even seemingly straightforward indicators of the 
government’s state of mind can be remarkably complex and convoluted 
in practice. Indeed, “material to payment” (i.e., that non-compliance 
has the capacity to, and probability of, influencing payment) is not, in 
practice, synonymous with “important” or even “vital” to payment. 
Indeed, in many cases, CMS may care quite a bit about a given rule 
despite the fact that, as a practical matter, CMS would not withhold 
payment if that rule was violated, meaning that such rule never had 
the capacity to influence payment. Particularly in the context of federal 
health care programs, the decision to pay or not to pay could be 
expected to be influenced by a variety of considerations unrelated to 
the pure import of the non-compliance, such as the fact that patients 
would be harmed by withholding payment, balancing of resources to 
enforce the rule, or other policy considerations relevant to a particular 
product, service, or program. From this perspective, whether a 
particular failing is actually material is highly contextualized, and 
might vary from provider to provider, depending on the decision-maker, 
the times, the degree of non-compliance, and the perceived impact of 
non-payment on Medicare beneficiaries. Some facilities may simply be 
“too big to fail,” 141 while others may find themselves on thin ice due to 
historically poor relationships with government-contracted surveyors 
and auditors. Setting aside the equitable issues in such a disparate 
approach, but acknowledging its reality, the fact that CMS approaches 
payment on a provider-by-provider and situation-by-situation basis, 
CMS’s disparate treatment of providers may limit the ability to 
establish the existence of materiality by reference to the government’s 
conduct from provider to provider. 
Another complicating factor is the question of which of the many 
levels and representatives of “government” involved in the 
administration of the programs have the authority to make 
determinations regarding materiality. This issue is most evident when 
considering whether the standard goes to the essence of the bargain. 
Whose opinions must a provider consider relevant and who may testify 
 
141. See, e.g., Ruckh, 304 F. Supp. 3d at 1264 (citing the large size of the 
provider and the fact that it provides an essential service to a large 
population, who could not otherwise access the service as relevant 
counter-weights to an assertion of materiality, in that they suggest that 
non-payment may not be the expected response to non-conformance). 
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as to the state of mind of the government? Must an official be acting 
within the scope of her authority in making the decision to pay or not 
to pay?142 In one particularly stunning case, the relator advanced the 
proposition that the oral opinions of an employee of the state Medicaid 
agency were sufficient to establish that a given requirement was 
material to CMS’s decision of whether or not to pay a claim. 143 It is, 
moreover, unclear to what degree the opinions of Medicare 
Administrative Contractors (“MACs”), Administrative Law Judges 
(“ALJs”), the HHS Department’s Appeal Board, the HHS Office of 
Inspector General (“OIG”), or any given governmental official are 
relevant to a determination of materiality. It is also unclear how, if 
these opinions were relevant to such a determination, one could 
reconcile such significance with the principle, applicable to ALJ 
Opinions144 and OIG Opinions,145, that they do not bind third-parties,  
142. See, e.g., Memorandum from the Deputy Att’y Gen. to All Component 
Heads and U.S. Attorneys on Bringing Criminal Charges Against 
Corporations (June 16, 1999), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/
files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2010/04/11/charging-corps.PDF 
[https://perma.cc/4XGX-83Y2]. 
143. See Olson v. Fairview Health Servs. of Minnesota, 831 F.3d 1063, 1073–
74 (8th Cir. 2016). 
144. Medicare ALJ Opinions do not have precedential effect. However, the 
Chair of the Department of Health and Human Services Departmental 
Appeals Board (“DAB Chair”) may designate a final decision issued by 
the Medicare Appeals Council as precedential. 42 C.F.R. 
§ 401.109(a) (2019). In adopting this rule, the government explained: 
“Individual determinations and decisions by CMS contractors, OMHA 
ALJs, and the Council currently are not precedential and have no binding 
effect on future initial determinations (and equivalent determinations) or 
claims appeals. We did not propose to change the non-precedential status 
and non-binding effect on future initial determinations (and equivalent 
determinations) or claim appeals of any determinations or decisions except 
as to Council decisions designated as precedential by the DAB Chair.” 
Medicare Program: Changes to the Medicare Claims and Entitlement, 
Medicare Advantage Organization Determination, and Medicare 
Prescription Drug Coverage Determination Appeals Procedures, 82 Fed. 
Reg. 4974, 4978 (Jan. 17, 2017). 
145. See Zimmer, Inc. v. Nu Tech Medical, Inc., 54 F. Supp. 2d 850, 855 (N.D. 
Ind. 1999) (“Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7d(b), the Secretary of the 
Department of Health and Human Services, in consultation with the 
Attorney General, is authorized to issue advisory opinions on specific 
topics, including what constitutes prohibited remuneration under § 1320a-
7b(b), and whether any activity or proposed activity could result in 
imposition of sanctions or exclusion from participation in federal health 
care programs. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7d(b)(2). An advisory opinion 
issued by the Secretary binds the Secretary and the party or parties 
requesting the opinion. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7d(b)(4)(A). A party’s failure 
to seek or join a request for an advisory opinion may not be used as 
evidence to prove that the party intended to violate federal health care 
statutes. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7d(b)(4) (B).”). “An advisory opinion issued 
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or the principle, applicable to MACs, that, as non-governmental bodies, 
they have limited authority.146 
There is, moreover, the fact that the government’s view of a 
particular requirement may not be static. The OIG, for example, issues 
Opinions relating to whether or not particular arrangements are 
compliant with AKS. One can imagine that an Opinion suggesting that 
a certain type of arrangement implicated the AKS would be relevant to 
showing that the government viewed conformance with these 
“requirements” as material to AKS compliance, and thus, ultimately, 
as material to payment. Setting aside, for a moment, the problem of 
whether such an inference is warranted, and further, whether the 
Opinion should be admissible, there is the problem of changing views 
expressed through the Opinion process. For example, in one case: 
OIG originally issued [the requester] PSI an advisory opinion on 
April 4, 2002, covering PSI’s proposed arrangement to subsidize 
the medical care costs of ‘financially needy Medicare 
beneficiaries.’ Following publication of the 2014 PAP [Patient 
Assistance Program] Bulletin, however, OIG informed PSI [as it 
did other PAPs with advisory opinions that were inconsistent 
with the 2014 PAP Bulletin] that, in light of the concerns 
reflected in that guidance document, OIG would require certain 
changes for PSI to retain its favorable advisory opinion. This set 
off a lengthy negotiation process between OIG and PSI, which 
lasted for more than two years, over the facts that PSI would 
 
by the OIG will have no application to any individual or entity that does 
not join in the request for the opinion. No individual or entity other than 
the requestor(s) may rely on an advisory opinion.” 42 
C.F.R. § 1008.53 (2019). See also Def.’s Mem. Supp. Mot. for Leave to 
Take Disc., Patient Services, Inc. v. United States, No. 3:18-cv-0016, at 
2 (E.D. Va. July 18, 2018), https://www.druganddevicelawblog.com/wp-
content/uploads/sites/30/2018/07/Patient-Services-OIG-Motion.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WP7H-2BCW] (“OIG is an independent and objective 
oversight unit created to carry out the mission of preventing fraud and 
abuse and promoting economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of HHS 
programs and operations. See 5 U.S.C. App. 3 § 2 (Inspector General Act 
of 1978). One of its functions is to issue, in consultation with the 
Department of Justice (“DOJ”), written advisory opinions regarding the 
interpretation and application of certain statutory provisions designed to 
deter fraud and abuse in the referral of federal healthcare program 
beneficiaries (such as Medicare and Medicaid recipients) to particular 
medical goods and services. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7d(b.).”). 
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need to certify as true in order to retain its favorable advisory 
opinion.147 
Here, the view of the government as to what was required for AKS 
compliance was malleable, and ultimately, negotiable. Assuming that 
the OIG’s position on conformance with the AKS could be admissible 
and relevant evidence of the government’s determination of materiality, 
which of these positions would be the relevant one, and for what time 
period? 
The problem of tracking the government’s evolving view of its own 
requirements comes into sharp relief when one considers the dilemma 
of a healthcare provider’s assessment of whether or not she has reverse 
false claims liability. Under the FCA, a person can be liable for a 
“reverse false claim” if she submits a claim with good intent, but later 
becomes aware that the claim is legally false at the time it was paid, 
such that she we not entitled to payment and fails to timely return the 
overpayment to the government.148 To determine whether or not a 
payment was made for a legally false claim, the defendant must assess 
any identified non-conformance with law and decide whether or not it 
would have been considered material by the government at the time 
that the claim was submitted, which may be many years prior to the 
assessment.149 The retrospective nature of this inquiry raises some 
additional questions. For example, how can the provider establish the 
government’s actual view of the issue as of the relevant time? Of what 
relevance are actions of the government that post-date the submission 
date? How is one to distinguish a recently-articulated view of 
materiality from a recently-evolved view of materiality? How would a 
provider demonstrate what he or she knew of these indicators at the 
time of submission of the claim? 
The problems posed by the government’s inability to articulate 
clear and consistent expectations is more than merely hypothetical or 
philosophical; it creates real confusion for healthcare providers who 
often find themselves having to decide, based on unclear and 
inconsistent instructions, whether large sums of money must be 
returned to CMS. As well, as noted above in Section II.B, a similar 
problem pervades the question of when a standard has been expressed 
 
147. Def.’s Mem. Supp. Mot. for Leave to Take Disc., No. 3:18-cv-0016, at 5. 
148. 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2018) (“[T]he term ’obligation’ means an established 
duty, whether or not fixed, arising from an express or implied contractual, 
grantor-grantee, or licensor-licensee relationship, from a fee-based or 
similar relationship, from statute or regulation, or from the retention of 
any overpayment . . . .”). 
149. See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 401.305(e)-(f) (2019) (requiring that any 
overpayment must be reported and returned if a person identifies an 
overpayment within six years of the date it was received). 
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with sufficient clarity and finality to cause the defendant to have 
scienter. 
Adopting the view that the government holds a knowable, 
consistent, and unitary view of materiality, while at the same time 
disregarding the only objective expression of that view—the designation 
in a statute or regulation that it is a condition to payment—interferes 
with the predictable assessment of materiality, and, ultimately, FCA 
liability. Given the intensive involvement of multiple governmental 
agencies, state and federal actors, and private subcontractors in the 
administration of claims,150 it is difficult to say if and when the 
government knew of non-conformance with any particular standard, at 
what point the government began to care, or if the government was, or 
would have been, inclined to condition reimbursement on compliance 
with a given standard. 
3. OIG Treatment of Billing Non-Compliance as a Case in Point 
Many of the difficulties in determining materiality are illustrated 
by the way the government has treated non-conformity with billing 
“requirements” for continuous positive airway pressure (“CPAP”) 
supplies. CPAP supplies are meant to assist individuals who suffer from 
sleep apnea, a condition that results in an often-debilitating and 
dangerous inability to breathe while sleeping.151 For a number of years, 
and on multiple occasions, the government has noted that Durable 
Medical Equipment (“DME”) suppliers are overwhelmingly non-
compliant with a variety of Medicare requirements relating primarily 
to documentation of medical necessity.152 In the face of this 
 
150. For example, one court held that the government’s reimbursement of 
prescription drugs for off-label uses “does not establish that the 
requirement [prohibiting off-label use] is immaterial as a matter of 
law.” United States v. Celgene Corp., 226 F. Supp.3d 1032, 1050 (C.D. 
Cal. 2016). Similarly, “[t]he fact that the FDA knew generally about off-
label use does not mean CMS knew about and agreed to reimburse 
particular off-label claims.” Id. And “the fact that CMS included off-label 
uses of [a drug] in a program designed to expand the scope of Medicare’s 
prescription drug coverage on a temporary basis and for a limited number 
of patients does not show that CMS was willing to pay for these uses more 
generally.” Id. 
151. John Donovan, How to Sleep Easier with your CPAP 
Machine, WEBMD (May 2, 2016), https://www.webmd.com/sleep-
disorders/sleep-apnea/features/cpap-machine [https://perma.cc/BA92-
C4DH]. 
152. See, e.g., OFF. INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERV., OIE 04-
99-00670, MEDICAL EQUIPMENT SUPPLIERS: COMPLIANCE WITH MEDICARE 
STANDARDS (2001), https://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-04-99-00670.pdf
[https://perma.cc/44A6-CN25] (concluding that over fifty percent of 
suppliers did not comply with a consumer information standard, but 
recommended responses to not include non-payment). “The OIG issued a 
report in August 2008 regarding an audit of CMS’ medical review of DME 
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acknowledged wide-spread non-compliance, the government has, by and 
large, continued to pay claims for CPAP supplies, and, at least on one 
occasion, has suggested that the appropriate response to broad-based 
non-compliance with these and similar standards is something other 
than non-payment.153 A reasonable DME supplier could, thus, conclude 
that the government, through its inaction and statements, has conceded 
that compliance with these standards is not a material condition of 
payment. 
Notwithstanding this observation, in late 2018, OIG took action to 
retrieve payments from CPAP suppliers. It conducted a study of CPAP 
billing and found that many claims were for services “that durable 
medical equipment suppliers submitted for replacement positive airway 
pressure (PAP) device supplies [that] did not comply with Medicare 
requirements.”154 It then summarily observed that: “On the basis of our 
sample results, we estimated that Medicare made overpayments of 
almost $631.3 million for replacement PAP device supply claims that 
did not meet Medicare requirements.”155 
Even though the OIG report merely assessed compliance with a 
variety of statutory, regulatory, and sub-regulatory standards and 
provided no analysis to support its conclusion that non-compliance with 
any, or all, of these standards was a material condition of payment, the 
report seemed to assume that all payments made in the face of any non-
compliance with any of the considered standards were overpayments. 
 
claims paid by Medicare in fiscal year 2006. Based on its review of a 
sample of DME claims, the OIG estimated that the Medicare payment 
error rate was 28.9 percent. In other words, almost 30 percent of the DME 
claims reviewed were erroneously paid by the Medicare program. In its 
report, the OIG noted that ‘Medicare claims from DME suppliers have 
historically been more vulnerable to billing fraud and abuse than claims 
from other providers because of weak Medicare payment controls. It 
recommended that, in reviewing DME claims, ‘CMS obtain all medical 
records (including, but not limited to, physician’s records) for DME claims 
and contact the beneficiaries named on high-risk claims.’ In its Semi-
Annual Report to Congress, the OIG further highlighted the 
recommendation that CMS have its contractors ‘review all available 
supplier documentation and all medical records necessary to determine 
compliance with applicable requirements on medical necessity.’” Tom 
Herrmann, Durable Medical Equipment (DME) Documentation Required 




153. HHS OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., MOST MEDICARE CLAIMS FOR 
REPLACEMENT POSITIVE AIRWAY PRESSURE DEVICE SUPPLIES DID NOT 
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In other words, by deeming the entire universe of uncovered errors as 
resulting in “overpayments,” the OIG report appears to assert that 
CMS both could and should recoup payment for all such claims and 
that to retain such overpayments could result in reverse FCA liability 
for CPAP suppliers. Should a CPAP supplier understand from this that 
the OIG’s statement represents an accurate view of the government’s 
position regarding the materiality of each such standard? If so, must 
the supplier promptly repay amounts relating to any claims that exhibit 
the deficiencies cited by the OIG or face reverse FCA liability? Or, 
should the supplier understand, as seems more likely to be the case, 
that the OIG simply conflated, without much thought as to legal 
significance, any degree of non-conformance with the existence of an of 
overpayment that must be returned by the supplier? However, at odds 
with the practices of CMS, OIG seems to have assumed that the correct 
response for non-compliance with any standard whatsoever is non-
payment. Instead of intending a sweeping profession of the materiality 
of all CPAP billing requirements, however, it seems more likely that 
the OIG simply failed to think through the import of the terminology 
that it chose to describe the extent of non-compliance in the billing of 
CPAP supplies. 
More recently, OIG conducted a similar inquiry into non-
compliance with Medicare “documentation requirements” for inhalation 
drugs (drugs breathed directly into the lungs, such as inhalers for 
asthma and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease).156 The 
documentation standards in question supported certain statutory 
requirements but were derived from an LCD and CMS’s sub-regulatory 
Medicare Program Integrity Manual.157 These were that: 
For an inhalation drug to be eligible for Medicare reimbursement, 
the supplier must have a signed, detailed written order from the 
prescribing physician; proof of delivery; and, for refills of the 
original order, a documented refill request. The supplier must 
contact the beneficiary before dispensing a refill to (1) ensure that 
the refilled item remains reasonable and necessary and that 
existing supplies are approaching exhaustion and (2) confirm any 
changes or modifications to the order. The supplier must also 
maintain timely documentation to support that the inhalation 
drug continues to be used by the beneficiary.158 
On the basis of non-compliance with these requirements, OIG 
“estimated that $92.5 million of the $259.5 million paid to suppliers for 
 
156. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFF. INSPECTOR GEN., A-09-18-
03018, MEDICARE IMPROPERLY PAID SUPPLIERS AN ESTIMATED $92.5 
MILLION FOR INHALATION DRUGS (2019). 
157. Id. at 3. 
158. Id. 
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inhalation drugs was unallowable for Medicare reimbursement.”159 OIG 
“recommend[ed] that CMS instruct the Medicare contractors to recover 
$36,825 in overpayments for the 39 unallowable claim lines and notify 
the 22 suppliers associated with the 39 claim lines with potential 
overpayments of $36,825 so that those suppliers can exercise reasonable 
diligence to investigate and return any identified overpayments . . . ”160 
OIG observed that there was a very high industry-wide rate of 
erroneous claims for these drugs, with the “Medicare fee-for-service 
improper payments reports for 2010 to 2018 (indicating) . . . that the 
improper payment rates ranged from 11 to 68 percent.”161 
As with the CPAP supplies, the OIG concluded that the inhalation 
drugs audit report constituted credible information of potential 
overpayments with the consequence that suppliers that received 
notification of these potential overpayments were subject to potential 
overpayment liability under the FCA if they did not “(1) exercise 
reasonable diligence to investigate the potential overpayment, (2) 
quantify any overpayment amount over a six-year lookback period, and 
(3) report and return any overpayments within 60 days of identifying 
those overpayments (60-day rule).”162 Some of the examples of non-
conformance offered were minor, indicating that CMS likely received 
the benefit of its bargain in at least some of the cases in which OIG 
appeared to be demanding repayment: 
For example, Medicare paid a supplier $12,229 for providing 
treprostinil, an inhalation drug used to treat pulmonary arterial 
hypertension, to a beneficiary on November 7, 2017. For this 
sampled claim line, the supplier provided to us a delivery record 
showing that it had shipped the item to its retail store; however, 
the supplier did not provide us with the signed and dated delivery 
document verifying that the inhalation drug was delivered to the 
beneficiary.163 
There is a marked lack of attention to an analytically-coherent 
approach to distinctions between material and immaterial payment 
requirements that permeates the Medicare payment scheme. Notably, 
the manner in which these OIG reports evidence slavish adherence to 
programmatic requirements without regard to considerations of 
materiality is often a feature of audits performed by commercial 
contractors, who simultaneously define CMS’s day-to-day payment 
determinations, but also, as a matter of law, should not be permitted 
 
159. Id. at 11. 
160. Id. at 13. 
161. Id. at n.2 
162. Id. at 4. 
163. Id. at 8. 
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to define the government’s state of mind.164 For example, it is not 
uncommon for contractor-employed auditors to insist on a provider 
refunding the entire amount of a claim for services that fail to comply 
with fairly picayune standards or requirements (such as narrowly 
missing a documentation timing requirement), without considering 
whether or not the government has received all or most of the value of 
the bargain.165 On the other hand, there are contexts in which the 
existence of a systemic “error” rate appears to be acknowledged and 
accommodated as an inevitability. As noted above, the government has 
continued to routinely pay DME claims in the face of acknowledged, 
widespread non-compliance.166 
In an even more explicit example of the government’s acceptance 
of a structural rate of non-compliance in healthcare billing, for providers 
who are instructed to conduct period claims review under Corporate 
Integrity Agreements with OIG, OIG instructs that: 
If the net financial error rate of those . . . claims equals or exceeds 
5 percent, then a full sample must be reviewed and a systems 
review must be conducted. The full sample must include a 
sufficient number of paid claims to yield results that estimate the 
overpayment in the population within a 90 percent confidence 
and 25 percent precision level.167 
However, “[i]f the net financial error rate of the discovery sample is 
below 5 percent, the review is complete.”168 This is to say that, if a 
sample audit reveals a low but statistically-significant claims error rate, 
OIG, nonetheless, takes the position that the provider is not obligated 
to perform a full audit to root out and return overpayment, despite 
 
164. See generally What Is a MAC Audit?, OBERHEIDEN, P.C. (Nov. 13, 2017), 
https://medicare-lawyer.com/mac-audit/ (explaining that medical 
practices may be subject to audit if the MAC identifies 
“‘discrepancies’ even in situations where the billing was reasonable, 
medically necessary, and within CMS policy”)[https://perma.cc/V6P5-
E6JV]. 
165. See generally What Are Recovery Audit Contractors?, AM. COLLEGE OF 
CARDIOLOGY, https://www.acc.org/tools-and-practice-support/practice-
solutions/medicare-enrollment-and-claims-submission/recovery-audit-
contractors/what-are-racs [https://perma.cc/648N-EZXP] (last visited 
Aug. 12, 2020) (explaining that recovery audit contractors are paid a 
contingency fee to find overpayments, so their motives may be more 
aligned with finding large overpayments rather than egregious violations 
of the law). 
166. See supra notes 154–55 and accompanying text. 
167. Corporate Integrity Agreement FAQ, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., https://oig.hhs.gov/faqs/corporate-integrity-
agreements-faq.asp [https://perma.cc/2EHA-VMN6] (last visited Dec. 
26, 2019). 
168. Id. 
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knowledge of the error rate. These inconsistent approaches, both within 
OIG and between OIG and CMS, underscore the difficulty of deciding 
whether or not any given deviation is material, based on the 
government’s behavior. 
OIG’s approach in the reports also does not consider the legitimacy 
of the standards against which it measured conformance.169 What is the 
supplier to make of the fact that many of the standards considered by 
the OIG were not actually embodied in any statute or regulation, but, 
instead, were reflected only in non-authoritative LCDs or in other sub-
regulatory guidance?170 What of the fact that some of the standards 
were seemingly at odds with statutory and regulatory requirements?171 
Should the supplier understand that the government can, and has, 
somehow incorporated these sub-regulatory standards into its 
interpretation of a standard that is material to its payment decisions? 
Or, as seems more likely to be the case, should the supplier understand 
that the OIG simply assumed that the contractor standards were both 
authoritative and material, without engaging in legal analysis? 
III. Azar v. Allina Health Services 
A. Under the Medicare Act, Substantive Rules Are Subject to Notice-and-
Comment Rulemaking 
While not an FCA case, the recent Supreme Court case, Azar v. 
Allina Health Services,172 brings some much-needed clarity to the 
question of when the FCA can be used as a tool to hold providers 
accountable for compliance with the myriad of rules and regulations 
that attach to participation in the Medicare program, and, therefore, 
has broad-reaching implication for FCA cases going forward. Allina 
addressed the enforceability of a payment rule that was “promulgated” 
simply by publication on the CMS website without notice-and-
comment.173 The rule at issue in Allina changed a formula for calculating 
a payment due to hospitals related to the proportion of low income 
Medicare patients they served, and “dramatically—and retroactively—
 
169. See, e.g., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 156, at 13. 
170. An LCD is a determination by a MAC respecting whether or not a 
particular item or service is covered on a contractor–wide basis in 
accordance with Section 1862(a)(1)(A) of the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff. The 
2016 21st Century Cures Act included changes to the LCD adoption 
process, including requiring MACs to engage in certain notice-and-
comment procedures with respect to LCDs. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(l) 
(2018). These requirements are not, however, sufficient to meet the notice-
and-comment requirements of the Medicare Act. 42 U.S.C. § 1395hh 
(2018). See also supra, notes 44–50 and accompanying text. 
171. See supra notes 153–174 and accompanying text. 
172. Allina, 139 S. Ct. at 1804. 
173. Id. at 1808. 
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reduced payments to hospitals serving low-income patients.”174 While 
seemingly a narrow administrative law case, Allina deals with the 
ability of CMS to alter rights to payment through sub-regulatory 
guidance, and, therefore, ultimately sets boundaries on CMS’s ability 
to withhold payment or demand repayment for non-compliance with 
programmatic rules.175 As a result, Allina has significance for 
determinations that go to the heart of a substantial portion of FCA 
cases: whether non-conformance with a given CMS standard can be 
used as a predicate for FCA liability under a theory of legal falsity. 
The core issue in Allina was whether or not the new payment rule 
was exempt from notice-and-comment requirements under the Medicare 
Act.176 The Medicare Act, which ultimately governs all payments made 
under the Medicare program, contains a requirement that “substantive” 
rules (as opposed to “procedural” rules) be promulgated via formal 
notice-and-comment rulemaking.177 The APA, on the other hand, which 
broadly governs the administrative rulemaking of federal agencies, 
provides that interpretive rules, along with procedural rules, and several 
other categories of rules, are exempt as a class from the procedural 
prerequisite of notice-and-comment rulemaking.178 These exempted 
rules are accorded substantial legal effect via traditional deference 
analysis, which is predicated on the APA’s grant of authority to 
agencies to adopt such rules.179 HHS acknowledged the requirements of 
 
174. Id. 
175. See generally id. 
176. Id. at 1810. 
177. Id. 
178. Section 553 of the APA exempts from the notice-and-comment process: 
rules involving military and foreign affairs; “matter[s] relating to agency 
management or personnel or to public property, loans, grants, benefits, or 
contracts”; “rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice”; 
interpretative rules and general statements of policy; and rules as to which 
the agency has good cause to conclude that notice-and-comment would 
be “impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public 
interest.” Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §553 (2006). 
179. Under APA jurisprudence, interpretive rules are not themselves binding 
but constitute authoritative interpretations of binding law, via so-called 
“Auer deference” to agency interpretive authority. As a practical matter, 
this means that many interpretative rules are given substantial weight, 
which, in practice, has binding legal effect. The Supreme Court explained 
this dynamic in a recent case: 
Kisor [the plaintiff] . . . claims that Auer circumvents the APA’s 
rulemaking requirements. Section 553, as Kisor notes, mandates 
that an agency use notice-and-comment procedures before issuing 
legislative rules. But the section allows agencies to issue 
“interpret[ive]” rules without notice-and-comment. A key feature 
of those rules is that (unlike legislative rules) they are not 
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the Medicare Act, but argued that its new payment rule simply 
articulated HHS’s changed understanding of existing statutory 
requirements, and was, therefore, an “interpretive” rule, as defined 
under the APA.180 HHS further argued that the term “substantive” did 
not incorporate valid interpretive rules, and that the Medicare Act was 
to be read in tandem with the APA.181 As a result, HHS reasoned, 
Medicare interpretive rules were exempted from notice-and-comment 
requirements in the same manner as the interpretive rules of other 
agencies and programs are explicitly exempted from such requirements 
under the APA.182 Thus, HHS argued, the rule was not subject to notice-
 
supposed to “have the force and effect of law”—or, otherwise said, 
to bind private parties. Instead, interpretive rules are meant only 
to “advise the public” of how the agency understands, and is likely 
to apply, its binding statutes and legislative rules. But 
consider, Kisor argues, what happens when a court 
gives Auer deference to an interpretive rule. The result, he asserts, 
is to make a rule that has never gone through notice-and-comment 
binding on the public. Or put another way, the interpretive rule 
ends up having the “force and effect of law” without ever paying 
the procedural cost. 
But this Court rejected the identical argument just a few years 
ago, and for good reason. In Mortgage Bankers, we held that 
interpretive rules, even when given Auer deference, do not have the 
force of law. An interpretive rule itself never forms “the basis for 
an enforcement action”—because, as just noted, such a rule does 
not impose any “legally binding requirements” on private parties. 
An enforcement action must instead rely on a legislative rule, 
which (to be valid) must go through notice-and-comment. And in 
all the ways discussed above, the meaning of a legislative rule 
remains in the hands of courts, even if they sometimes divine that 
meaning by looking to the agency’s interpretation. Courts first 
decide whether the rule is clear; if it is not, whether the agency’s 
reading falls within its zone of ambiguity, and even if the reading 
does so, whether it should receive deference. In short, courts retain 
the final authority to approve—or not—the agency’s reading of a 
notice-and-comment rule. No binding of anyone occurs merely by 
the agency’s say-so. 
 Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2420 (2019) (internal citations omitted). 
180. Allina, 139 S. Ct. at 1810–11. 
181. Id. at 1811. 
182. The APA, among other things, excepts from notice-and-comment 
“interpretative rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency 
organization, procedure, or practice.” 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2018). The 
Medicare Act excepts only rules that are excepted by statute or that are 
promulgated under Section 553 of Title 5 (which governs rules related to 
a military or foreign affairs function of the United States, or a matter 
relating to agency management or personnel or to public property, loans, 
grants, benefits, or contracts). 42 U.S.C. § 1395hh(3)(c) (2018). 
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and-comment requirements and should be accorded judicial deference.183 
The hospitals that challenged the rule argued that the rule was not 
procedural, but substantive, with the consequence that it required 
notice and comment to be effective.184 
The Court rejected the government’s argument that interpretive 
rules, as a class were excluded from the requirements applicable to 
substantive rules and concluded that the government had conceded that 
there was a statutory gap, in that the “rule” in question was not 
articulated in the statute. The Court held that “when the government 
establishes or changes an avowedly substantive ‘gap’-filling policy, it 
can’t evade its notice-and-comment obligations . . . on the strength of 
the arguments it has advanced in this case.”185 In other words, 
substantive rules promulgated by CMS, whether interpretive or not, 
are subject to notice and comment.186 The Court appears to endorse, if 
 
183. Allina, 139 S. Ct. at 1807 (“The government suggests the statute means 
to distinguish a substantive from an interpretive legal standard and thus 
tracks the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), under 
which ’substantive rules’ have the ’force and effect of 
law,’ while ’interpretive rules’ merely ’advise the public of the agency’s 
construction of the statutes and rules which it administers.’ Because the 
policy of counting Part C patients in the Medicare fractions would be 
treated as interpretive rather than substantive under the APA, the 
government submits, it had no statutory obligation to provide notice and 
comment before adopting the policy.”). 
184. Id. at 1811 (“The hospitals suggest the statute means to distinguish a 
substantive from a procedural legal standard. On this account, a 
substantive standard is one that ‘creates duties, rights and obligations,’ 
while a procedural standard specifies how those duties, rights, and 
obligations should be enforced. Black’s Law Dictionary 1281 (5th ed. 
1979) (defining ‘substantive law’). And everyone agrees that a policy of 
counting Part C patients in the Medicare fraction is substantive in this 
sense, because it affects a hospital’s right to payment. From this it follows 
that the public had a right to notice-and-comment before the government 
could adopt the policy at hand.” (emphasis added)). 
185. Id. at 1817. 
186. The Medicare Act gives the Secretary authority to prescribe regulations 
to administer Medicare at 42 U.S.C. § 1395hh(a)(2) (2018). That Section 
provides that any “rule, requirement, or other statement of policy (other 
than a national coverage determination) that establishes or changes a 
substantive legal standard governing the scope of benefits, the payment 
for services, or the eligibility of individuals, entities, or organizations to 
furnish or receive services or benefits under this subchapter” must be 
promulgated by the Secretary by regulation. It then goes on to specify 
what is required in the way of notice-and-comment for such regulations, 
which includes the requirement that, with certain limited exceptions, “the 
Secretary shall provide for notice of the proposed regulation in the Federal 
Register and a period of not less than 60 days for public comment 
thereon.” The 60-day requirement is twice the APA minimum of 30 days. 
42 U.S.C. § 1395hh(c)(3) (2018). 
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not fully embrace, the traditional distinction between procedural and 
substantive rules advanced by the plaintiff hospitals.187 
In contrast to the broad powers to articulate and enforce 
interpretive rules granted to federal agencies under the APA, the Allina 
Court held that the Medicare Act requires that all substantive rules 
that establish or change a standard governing the scope of benefits, the 
payment for services, or eligibility to furnish or receive Medicare-
reimbursed services be promulgated through notice-and-comment 
rulemaking process.188 As the agency has no authority to adopt so-
conceived “substantive-interpretive” rules other than by regulation, any 
rule promulgated by CMS that is “substantive” (i.e., that impacts a 
right to payment or benefits), including rules that would qualify as 
interpretive within the meaning of the APA, must be adopted via 
notice-and-comment rulemaking in order to have an authoritative 
effect. 
After Allina, improperly-adopted substantive rules, however they 
might be classified under APA analysis, would appear to have no ability 
to establish a rule different than or in addition to those which have 
been properly promulgated. Improperly-adopted substantive rules 
should have significance only to the extent that they have the “power 
to persuade” as support for the enforcement of properly-promulgated 
substantive rules.189 By analogy to the APA, however, the deference 
doctrine could be applied to those classes of CMS rules explicitly 
excepted from notice-and-comment rulemaking under the APA. 
Because, after Allina, the government will not be able to access 
deference by arguing merely that a rule is interpretive; we would expect 
the focus of post-Allina disputes to be on whether rules are substantive 
or procedural. Under the Medicare Act, the analysis is binary: if the 
rule is substantive it must be adopted by notice and comment in order 
 
187. Allina, 139 S. Ct. at 1811; see also Select Specialty Hosp.-Denver, Inc. v. 
Azar, 391 F.Supp.3d 53, 68 (D.D.C. 2019) (the Circuit’s definition –which 
the Supreme Court thus neither fully endorsed nor rejected – grounded 
the definition of ‘substantive legal standard” in the dictionary definition 
of “substantive law.”). 
188. See generally Allina, 139 S. Ct. at 1811–12. 
189. See Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2414 (2019) (quoting 
Christopher, 567 U. S. at 159, quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 
134, 140 (1944)) (agency guidance that is undeserving of deference is not 
authoritative and has only the power to persuade). We are unaware of 
any authority that advances a theory under which such guidance would 
be given weight in construing the meaning of a statute or regulation, 
beyond the power to persuade. But cf. Memorandum from Kelly M. 
Cleary, Deputy Gen. Counsel & CMS Chief Legal Officer, and Breanna 
E. Jenny, Deputy Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., to 
Demetrios Kouzoukas, Principal Deputy Admin. & Dir. of the Ctr. for 
Medicare, on Impact of Allina on Medicare Payment Rules (Oct. 31, 
2019) [https://perma.cc/LPR3-BW3X] (which may be read to suggest 
that HHS subscribes to such a theory). 
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to be binding, and if it is not, it carries no inherent legal weight. The 
government is free to argue that a statute or regulation should be 
interpreted as it sees fit, but its argument carries no more weight than 
that advanced by the provider-defendant.190 
B. The Medicare Act’s Approach to CMS Sub-regulatory Guidance Is 
Best Understood in the Context of a Regulatory Scheme that Operates via 
Contractual Mechanisms 
Allina’s interpretation of the Medicare Act as requiring notice and 
comment for substantive rules to be enforceable means that, by statute, 
CMS is afforded less deference with respect to its interpretation of the 
rules that govern participation in federal healthcare programs than is 
afforded to other agencies with respect to their administrative schemes. 
While not widely or consistently recognized by the courts until the D.C. 
Circuit Court’s decision in Allina v. Price,191 the Medicare Act has long 
provided for a procedural approach to CMS rulemaking and guidance 
that is unique among federal agencies.192 
 
190. Indeed, this approach is supported by the regulations that CMS has 
promulgated under the Medicare Act. See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. 
§ 405.1062 (2019) (proscribing that ALJs, attorney adjudicators and the 
Medicare Appeals Council are not bound by LCDs, LMRPs, 
or CMS program guidance, such as program memoranda and manual 
instructions, but are required to give substantial deference to these 
policies if they are applicable to a particular case). 
191. See supra, note 12 and accompanying text. 
192. In their brief to the Supreme Court, the Respondents explained the 
history of the Medicare statute’s procedural requirements: 
When it first enacted the Medicare program in 1965, Congress 
gave the agency general authority to prescribe regulations for 
administering the program [but] did not specify at that time 
whether those regulations required notice-and-comment 
rulemaking . . . . In 1971, the agency announced a policy of 
following the APA’s notice-and-comment procedures for rules 
relating to Medicare benefits . . . even ‘where not required by 
law.’ . . . In 1986, Congress mandated for the first time that the 
agency follow notice-and-comment procedures, and articulated 
some requirements different from those under the APA . . . . A 
year later, still concerned that ‘important policies [were] being 
developed without benefit of the public notice-and-comment 
period,’ Congress further amended the Medicare statute to specify 
the kinds of policy changes that require adoption by regulation 
after notice-and-comment. Pursuant to those amendments, the 
statute now mandates: No rule, requirement, or other statement 
of policy (other than a national coverage determination) that 
establishes or changes a substantive legal standard governing the 
scope of benefits, the payment for services, or the eligibility of 
individuals, entities, or organizations to furnish or receive services 
or benefits under this subchapter shall take effect unless it is 
promulgated by the Secretary by regulation [through notice-and 
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In order to understand the reason for such differential treatment of 
Medicare rules and regulations, it is important to contextualize 
enforcement of the Medicare rules with respect to healthcare providers 
and suppliers. Healthcare provided to beneficiaries of federal healthcare 
programs is, in essence, a federally-procured service.193 Enforcement of 
the regulations and sub-regulatory guidance that govern the provisions 
of these services primarily manifests (at least in theory), therefore, not 
as enforcement of universally-applicable industry regulations (e.g., EPA 
emissions standards applicable to all factories), but as administrative 
prosecution of the terms of a contract between the government and 
individual persons and entities for the provision of healthcare items and 
services.194 Indeed, it is squarely the primary province of the states, 
 
comment rulemaking] . . . . When it adopted that language in 
1987, Congress went a step further to ensure advance notice of 
Medicare policy changes. When ‘manual instructions, 
interpretative rules, statements of policy, and guidelines of general 
applicability’ are not required to be promulgated by notice-and-
comment, Congress nonetheless required them to be published on 
a list in the Federal Register . . . . In 2003, Congress further 
modified the Medicare Act, again insisting on notice-and-comment 
rulemaking in circumstances where the APA does not require it: 
If the Secretary publishes a final regulation that includes a 
provision that is not a logical outgrowth of a previously-published 
notice of proposed rulemaking or interim final rule, such provision 
shall be treated as a proposed regulation and shall not take effect 
until there is the further opportunity for public comment and a 
publication of the provision again as a final regulation. At the 
same time, Congress addressed the retroactive application of 
substantive Medicare policy. It mandated that a ‘substantive 
change’ made in any of several forms of administrative issuances—
whether in ‘regulations, manual instructions, interpretive rules, 
statements of policy, or guidelines of general applicability’—’shall 
not be applied *** retroactively to items and services furnished 
before the effective date of the change,’ except under 
circumstances not applicable here. It also provides that ‘no action 
shall be taken against a provider of services or supplier with 
respect to non-compliance with such a substantive change.’ 
 Brief for Respondents Allina Health Services et al. at 3–4, Azar v. Allina 
Health Servs. 139 S. Ct. 1804 (2019) (No. 17-1484) (internal citations 
omitted). 
193. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a–7b(f) (2018) (defining “federal health care 
program” in part as “any plan or program that provides health benefits, 
whether directly, through insurance, or otherwise, which is funded 
directly, in whole or in part, by the United States Government”). 
194. See, e.g., Part C and Part D Enforcement Actions, CMS.GOV (Feb. 28, 
2020), https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Compliance-and-Audits/Part-C-
and-Part-D-Compliance-and-Audits/PartCandPartDEnforcement
Actions- [https://perma.cc/L67L-S4JV ] (“CMS has the authority to 
take enforcement or contract actions when CMS determines that a 
Medicare Plan Sponsor either: substantially fails to comply with program 
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rather than the federal government, to regulate broader public health.195 
Federal regulation of healthcare services is, on the other hand, more or 
less tied to the expenditure of federal funds.196 Restrictions placed on 
federal reimbursement for healthcare services must, therefore, balance 
sound policy-making that protects the integrity of federal healthcare 
programs and the fundamental need to ensure that healthcare 
providers, as third-party contractors, are fairly reimbursed for the items 
and services rendered to federal healthcare program beneficiaries. 
If CMS’s regulatory scheme is seen as operating primarily as the 
terms of a procurement contract between the government and private 
parties, articulating the conditions under which such private parties 
agree to provide items and services for the government’s benefit, it is 
unsurprising that the agency should not be able to unilaterally amend 
the terms of the arrangement by adding terms and conditions without 
proper notice.197 As the Kaiser court noted, Auer deference is rooted in 
part in the supposition that, where there is ambiguity, the agency 
knows best what is intended.198 This approach is at loggerheads with 
the well-known principle of interpretation of contractual ambiguity, of 
“construction against the drafter”199 and underscores the reason why the 
traditional approach to deference to agency interpretations might have 
been seen as unsuited to CMS guidance. The opportunity for comment 
can be seen as reflecting the recognition that, while CMS will not 
negotiate these amendments separately, equity and the need for 
 
and/or contract requirements, is carrying out its contract with CMS in a 
manner that is inconsistent with the efficient and effective administration 
of the Medicare Part C and Part D program requirements, or no longer 
substantially meets the applicable conditions of the Medicare Part C and 
D program.”). 
195. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 24–7 (1905). 
196. See generally Katherine A. Lauer, Jason M. Ohta & Amy E. 
Hargreaves, Violations of Payment/Participation Conditions as 
Predicates for False Claims, AM. BAR ASS’N, Spring/Summer 2011 
[https://perma.cc/F68X-JAMP] (explaining that many conditions of 
participation in federal health care programs relate to quality of care) 
197. Indeed, the Allina Court suggests this rationale when it states: “Congress 
could have thought those benefits especially valuable when it comes to a 
program where even minor changes to the agency’s approach can impact 
millions of people and billions of dollars in ways that are not always easy 
for regulators to anticipate.” 139 S. Ct. at 1816. 
198. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2412 (2019) (“The agency that ‘wrote 
the regulation’ will often have direct insight into what that rule was 
intended to mean.”). 
199. See, e.g., Badie v. Bank of Am., 67 Cal.App.4th 779, 801 (1998) (“[I]f the 
uncertainty is not removed by application of the other rules of 
interpretation, a contract must be interpreted most strongly against the 
party who prepared it. This last rule is applied with particular force in 
the case of adhesion contracts.”). 
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judicious policymaking in relation to the vast healthcare enterprise 
requires some opportunity for input prior to changing the rules of the 
game. 
C. What is a Substantive Rule? 
As explained above, post-Allina, CMS will have an incentive to 
characterize its rules affecting payment as non-substantive, and 
therefore, exempt from notice-and-comment rulemaking 
requirements.200 The Allina Court did not, however, render a definitive, 
replicable definition of the term “substantive.”201 The question of 
whether and to what extent a non-substantive rule can support an 
argument that a healthcare provider was or was not entitled to 
payment, merits some attention. 
In Allina, the Court rejected the government’s argument that 
“interpretive rules” are categorically excluded from the Act’s definition 
of “substantive rules.”202 It is clear, then, that the meaning of the term 
“substantive” for purposes of the Medicare Act is different from the 
meaning accorded the same term in APA parlance, where it is often 
used as a synonym for legislative rules.203 While Allina allows for the 
possibility of an as-yet unarticulated compelling argument to the 
contrary, Allina holds that a CMS-created formula that determines 
amounts due to providers that is not expressed in the statutes or 
regulations is substantive “gap-filler”.204 Several courts post-Allina have 
held that similar payment-determinative formulas are substantive for 
purposes of the Medicare Act.205 It also seems clear from Allina and its 
progeny that sub-regulatory guidance that merely states how the 
agency will implement a law, without altering the legal standards 
expressed in the law, need not be readopted in order for the principles 
 
200. See supra, note 110 and accompanying text. 
201. The dissent in Allina explains: “The Court not only leaves the APA 
behind; it fails to substitute any reasonably clear alternative standard. 
How is the agency to determine whether a rule ‘establishes or changes a 
substantive legal standard’? At one point, the Court refers to the 
hospitals’ view that the statute applies to agency actions that ‘creat[e] 
duties, rights and obligations,’ as distinct from [agency actions] 
that specif[y] how those duties, rights, and obligations should be enforced. 
But it later declines to ‘go so far as’ to fully endorse that view.” 139 S. 
Ct. at 1823 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
202. Id. As noted above, the APA excludes interpretative rules from the term 
“substantive” rules, and by reason of such exclusion, exempts these 
interpretive rules from notice-and-comment rulemaking, thereby creating 
the possibility that they be given effect via deference. 
203. See, e.g., David L. Franklin, Legislative Rules, Nonlegislative Rules, and 
the Perils of the Short Cut, 120 YALE L. J. 276 (2010). 
204. See Allina, 139 S. Ct. at 1817. 
205. See supra, note 135 and accompanying text. 
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that are articulated in both the law and the sub-regulatory guidance to 
have legal effect.206 
Beyond these two parameters, the courts have begun the work of 
determining whether, and when, CMS can apply standards that were 
not subjected to notice-and-comment to deny, withhold, or recoup 
payment for items or services rendered.207 From these decisions, an 
analytical framework that juxtaposes substantive and procedural rights 
is emerging.208 Under this framework, as a baseline inquiry, the court 
must consider whether the standard at issue is (i) procedural, or a mere 
policy statement, or (ii) substantive. If it is procedural or a policy, it is 
not subject to notice-and-comment, but is not binding, by definition.209 
If it is substantive, in order to have binding effect, and, indeed, any 
authority beyond the power to persuade, it must be adopted in a 
properly-adopted law or regulation.210 
The substantive/procedural dichotomy was first articulated by the 
Price court, and reprised as a possible definition of the term in Allina, 
which held that the rule at issue in Allina:211 
establishes a “substantive legal standard.” “Substantive law” is 
law that “creates, defines, and regulates the rights, duties, and 
powers of parties.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 
2014). A “substantive legal standard” at a minimum includes a 
standard that “creates, defines, and regulates the rights, duties, 
and powers of parties.” That is precisely what HHS’s 2012 
Medicare fractions do. The fiscal intermediaries must use HHS’s 
published Medicare fractions in determining how much the 
hospitals will be reimbursed. HHS’s fractions therefore define the 
scope of hospitals’ legal rights to payment for treating low-income 
patients.212 
Policy statements similarly articulate organizing principles for 
agency operations and do not impose obligations or restrictions on 
providers. For example, in Clarian Health West v. Hargan, a pre-Allina 
case that interpreted and applied the Medicare Act in a manner similar 
to Allina, the D.C. Circuit addressed provisions of a Medicare Manual 
 
206. See supra notes 168–170 and accompanying text. 
207. See infra, notes 211–225 and accompanying text. 
208. See id. 
209. See id. 
210. See id. 
211. Allina Health Services. v. Price, 863 F.3d 937, 942-43 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
212. Id. Notably, the APA also contemplates and exempts from notice-and-
comment requirements, separately from interpretive rules, a category of 
rules that are procedural, that comport with this dictionary definition: 
those rules that are of agency organization, procedure, or practice. See 
supra, note 136. 
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that related both to a change in the way in which the government 
provides hospitals extra reimbursement (“outlier payments”) for 
extraordinarily expensive care, as well as agency enforcement 
priorities.213 Consistent with Allina and our observation that standards 
that have the effect of determining the amount due are substantive, the 
Clarian court reasoned that changes to outlier payment calculations 
were substantive, as they clearly had an impact on the rights of 
healthcare providers who billed Medicare, explaining: “It cannot be 
seriously disputed that HHS’s authority to reconcile outlier payments 
alters providers’ legal rights. As [the application of the standard] may 
mean that a hospital receives millions of dollars less in payments than 
it otherwise would.”214 However, because this change in providers’ rights 
was also expressed in statutes and regulations, and not just in the 
Manual, the standard had been properly adopted.215 The remaining 
portion of the challenged standard appeared only in a Manual, but the 
court held that it was merely a policy that did not alter the applicable 
legal standards, 216 explaining: 
[T]he important point is that the agency maintains the same 
authority to reconcile any outlier payment that it had prior to 
the adoption of the Manual instructions. The instructions merely 
set forth an enforcement policy that determines when MACs will 
report hospitals for reconciliation. They do not change the legal 
standards that govern the hospitals, and they do not change the 
legal standards that govern the agency . . . . The agency’s 
authority is accordingly exactly as it would be if the Manual 
instructions did not exist. The hospitals’ legal entitlement to 
outlier payments is likewise unchanged. A hospital may pursue 
an action with the Board to challenge an agency decision to 
subject it to reconciliation without regard to . . . the . . . Manual 
instructions . . . . We conclude that the Manual instructions 
embody a general statement of policy, not a legislative rule, 
setting forth HHS’s enforcement priorities. Policy statements do 
not establish binding norms. And they are not “rules” that must 
be issued through notice-and-comment rule making . . . . Nor are 
the instructions subject to the Medicare Act’s independent notice-
and-comment requirement because they do not establish or 
change a substantive legal standard.217 
Because the substantive portions of the challenged standards were 
first articulated in properly-promulgated statutes and regulations and 
 
213. Clarian Health West, LLC v. Hargan, 878 F.3d 346, 349 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
214. Id. at 355 (emphasis added). 
215. Id. 
216. Id. at 356–57. 
217. Id. at 349, 355–56.        
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merely reprised in the Manual, and the remaining portions were merely 
statements of agency administrative policy without binding effect on 
the agency or the provider, both portions of the standards withstood 
challenge.218 
Adding a little more clarity to the question of when a standard is 
procedural, in Planned Parenthood of Wisconsin, Inc. v. Azar, which 
construed the APA rather than the Medicare Act, the court explained: 
Although Clarian Health focused on distinguishing between a 
legislative rule and a policy (not procedural) rule, the factual 
similarities are instructive. Like the challenged policy in Clarian 
Health, the Announcement’s revised scoring system (contested in 
the case at hand) imposes no legal obligations or prohibitions on 
the Plaintiffs, and is not outcome determinative: the Deputy 
Assistant Secretary retains final decision-making authority, just 
as before . . . . Indeed, the government has conclusively 
established that the Deputy Assistant Secretary makes the final 
award decisions and is not bound by panel scoring results . . . . 
Without legal effects that bind either the agency or private 
parties, the 2018 Announcement does not have ramifications that 
would require public participation and information-gathering “to 
safeguard the policies underlying the APA.” . . . the 2018 
Announcement is a procedural rule, lacking the force of law, and 
thus exempt from the APA’s requirements for formal 
rulemaking.219 
These cases stand for the proposition that a rule is substantive if it 
imposes a legal obligation or restriction on providers, or has an impact 
on a right to reimbursement in a manner that is not necessarily 
compelled by statute or regulation. A non-substantive rule, on the other 
hand, sets forth an agency’s enforcement priorities, or organizing 
principles for the agency’s operations. From this, we understand that, 
as so defined, “policy statements” and, for the same reasons, 
“procedural rules” are not substantive rules. Further, we understand 
that, by definition, neither policy statements nor procedural rules are 
binding on providers. 
1. If a Documentation Requirement Creates a new Predicate to 
Meeting an Existing, Substantive Rule, Such a Requirement is, Itself, a 
Substantive Rule 
In many cases, but-for program requirements (i.e., requirements 
that create a unique predicate for payment) may masquerade as 
explanations of existing statutory or regulatory requirements. In such 
cases, a substantive, non-statutory norm may be expressed in a manner 
that makes it appear to be merely an administrative requirement In a 
 
218. Id. at 357–59. 
219. Id. at 307, 357–59. 
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post-Allina case, Select Specialty Hospital-Denver, Inc. v. Azar, the 
court held that the Medicare Act required CMS to afford full notice 
and comment to a standard that required that long-term care hospitals 
(“LTCHs”) have received a notice of denial from Medicaid (referred to 
as “Remittance Advice” or “RA”) before Medicare could be billed for 
the service.220 While the court acknowledged that validly promulgated 
statutes and regulations precluded LTCHs from billing Medicare for 
Medicaid-covered services, the court concluded that the requirement 
was more than what was called for under such statutes and 
regulations.221 As a result, the RA requirement was substantive and, per 
Allina, could only be enforced if adopted by notice-and-comment 
rulemaking.222 The court explained that what sounded like a procedural 
requirement—that LTCHs obtain an RA from Medicaid indicating an 
absence of coverage—was in reality substantive because the RA could 
be obtained if the LTCHs enrolled in Medicaid. The court explained: 
As a result of CMS’s implementation of [this] requirement, CMS 
changed not just the steps that existing LTCHs must take, vis-à-
vis CMS, to be reimbursed, but also changed whether such 
entities must form contracts with third parties, the state Medicaid 
programs. Deeming CMS’s imposition of this new obligation a 
mere change in procedure, as opposed to a change in substantive 
law, would be out of place. This new requirement of providing an 
RA, even if superficially appearing to be merely procedural, had 
significant substantive consequences for the contractual 
obligations that LTCHs had to undertake. The RA requirement 
has essentially changed the eligibility criteria for reimbursement 
under the Medicare Act for dual-eligible patients, by requiring 
 
220. Select Specialty Hosp.-Denver, Inc. v. Azar, 391 F.Supp.3d 53, 70 (D.D.C. 
2019), reconsideration denied, No. CV 10-1356 (BAH), 2019 WL 5697076 
(D.D.C Nov. 4, 2019). Under long-standing Medicare regulations, the 
hospitals’ bad debt was eligible for reimbursement, so long as, among 
other things, the provider is able to establish that “reasonable collection 
efforts were made.” Id. at 57. CMS explained what constituted reasonable 
collection efforts in its Provider Reimbursement Manual (“PRM”). With 
respect to dual-eligible patients (i.e., those enrolled in both Medicare and 
Medicaid), the court explained that CMS required that, to meet this 
regulatory standard, the provider “must determine that no source other 
than the patient would be legally responsible for the patient’s medical 
bill . . . Accordingly, the PRM requires providers to determine that 
Medicaid is not ‘legally responsible’ for a dual-eligible patient’s medical 
bills before seeking reimbursement from Medicare”, by billing Medicaid 
(the “must-bill” policy). Id. at 58. As evidence of compliance with this 
requirement, CMS required that the Providers obtain a Medicaid 
remittance advice (“RA”). Id. 
221. Id. at 69–70. 
222. Id. at 70. 
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provider participation in the state Medicaid program. This change 
makes the RA requirement “substantive.” . . .  
[T]he agency has not argued that these requirements are 
compelled by the Medicare Act itself. Rather, CMS is filling a 
‘gap’ as to how best to administer the Medicare program. As the 
Supreme Court has made clear, however, CMS ‘can’t evade its 
notice-and-comment obligation under § 1395hh(a)(2),’ just 
because the agency is changing a ‘gap-filing policy.’ Thus, when 
CMS imposed the RA requirement, it changed a “substantive 
legal standard”—state Medicaid participation—that the LTCHs 
had to satisfy for reimbursement to occur, and CMS was required 
to conduct notice-and-comment rulemaking . . . .223 
Select Specialty Hospital-Denver, Inc. stands for the proposition 
that a requirement that compels a provider to enter into a contract 
with a third party is substantive, rather than procedural. The 
recognition that a requirement that mediates relationships between the 
provider and someone other than CMS is substantive and consistent 
with the holding in Price that a substantive rule is one that regulates 
the duties of the parties.224 If a requirement imposes a mandatory 
directive relating to a provider’s actions with respect to a party other 
than CMS, it should be considered to be substantive, rather than 
procedural. More importantly, Select Specialty Hospital-Denver, Inc. 
underscores the fact that when compliance with a documentation 
requirement compels a healthcare provider to engage in an act in which 
the provider would not be required to engage absent the documentation 
requirement, the documentation requirement is substantive, rather than 
merely procedural. This observation is critical, as many CMS-mandated 
actions manifest in the form of documentation requirements.225 As 
illustrated by the two OIG Reports discussed above, the government 
has lately taken to suggesting that the mere failure to comply with a 
documentation requirement can be the basis of a repayment obligation 
under the reverse false claims provisions of the FCA, that is, that a 
claim submitted in the absence of the particular documentation 
constitutes a legally false claim. 
The Select Specialty Hospital-Denver, Inc. holding should be read 
to encompass any documentation requirement that, in practice, requires 
 
223. Id. at 69–70 (internal citations omitted). 
224. See supra, note 10 and accompanying text. 
225. See, e.g., CTR. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERV., STANDARD ELEMENTS 
FOR DURABLE MEDICAL EQUIPMENT, PROSTHETICS, ORTHOTICS, AND 
SUPPLIES (DMEPOS) ORDER, AND MASTER LIST OF DMEPOS ITEMS 
POTENTIALLY SUBJECT TO A FACE-TO-FACE ENCOUNTER AND WRITTEN 
ORDERS PRIOR TO DELIVERY AND, OR PRIOR AUTHORIZATION 
REQUIREMENTS (2020), https://www.cms.gov/files/document/
se20007.pdf [https://perma.cc/7H2N-MZ64]. 
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that a provider engage in acts in relation to a third party that are not 
otherwise required by law. Such an obligation alters the substantive 
rights of the provider and imposes, albeit indirectly, a new condition of 
participation. This same logic should apply when, in order to be able 
to comply with a documentation requirement, the provider must 
develop material operational capabilities. For example, a requirement 
that a hospital must document that it has a crash cart in every room 
in order for a particular service to be covered is, in actuality, a 
requirement that a hospital purchase crash carts. A requirement that a 
patient receive a particular test in order to qualify for coverage of a 
particular procedure is a requirement that the test be administered. It 
would seem, therefore, that both of these documentation requirements 
impose substantive obligations that are prerequisites to payment. To 
the extent that, in practice, a standard affects how the provider must 
engage with the world (e.g., whether the provider must contract with 
a third party) or how the provider’s engagement with the world is 
reimbursed (e.g., how payments for accepting uninsured patients are 
calculated), such a rule impacts a right to payment and is, therefore, 
substantive. A rule that creates standards that only impact how a 
provider engages with CMS to satisfy other obligations (e.g., meeting a 
filing deadline), on the other hand, could fairly be characterized a 
procedural. 
It is clear from Allina, the Medicare Act, and the post-Allina case 
law that a CMS reimbursement standard is substantive if it: (i) changes 
the basis on which healthcare providers are compensated; (ii) imposes 
on a provider a duty to act or refrain from acting, that functions as a 
condition to payment; or (iii) otherwise mandates an action or process 
that is outcome-determinative of whether and how much payment will 
be made. 
D. Only Substantive Standards that Are Properly Promulgated Can Serve 
as a Basis for FCA Liability 
1. Non-Conformance with a Substantive Standard That is not Properly 
Adopted Cannot Serve as a Basis for a FCA Action Based on Legal 
Falsity 
Allina sets forth a major boundary on the requirements on which 
CMS can condition payment.226 While not itself an FCA case, Allina 
appears to have substantial implications for the universe of 
requirements to which a healthcare provider may be held to account 
via the FCA. If a substantive requirement does not satisfy the Medicare 
Act’s requirement for substantive rulemaking, it cannot impact a right 
to payment; and if such a requirement cannot impact a right to 
payment, then the requirement cannot be material to payment under 
an Escobar analysis because CMS cannot assert that it may not or 
 
226. See supra, notes 179–198 and accompanying text. 
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would not have paid the claim but for its belief that the requirement 
had been met. Put simply, the theory of legal falsity falls apart if CMS 
lacked authority to withhold payment for non-compliance with the 
requirement at issue. 
Recently, a district court addressed an FCA claim predicated on 
non-conformance with a standard that appeared in a Manual.227 The 
district court dismissed the claim because the sub-regulatory standard 
with which the defendant had allegedly not complied imposed 
additional substantive requirements.228 The court first concluded that 
the requirement (referred to as “the 24-hour policy”) was a “substantive 
legal standard” and consequently, required notice-and-comment 
rulemaking procedures, because, like the standards at issue in Allina 
and Select Specialty, the standard “determined entitlement to 
reimbursement . . . delineat[ing] the circumstances in which a hospital 
is entitled to higher inpatient reimbursement.”229 The court went on to 
 
227. Polansky v. Exec. Health Res., Inc., 422 F. Supp. 3d 916, 937 (E.D. Pa. 
2019). 
228. Id. at 938. 
229. Id. at 935. The court explained: 
Case law applying the District of Columbia Circuit’s formulation 
of the definition for “substantive legal standard” illuminates a 
distinction between, on the one hand, rules that determine 
reimbursement and, on the other, statements that set forth 
enforcement policies. If a policy affects the right to, or amount of, 
reimbursement, it is more likely to be deemed a “substantive legal 
standard” . . . . Conversely, if a policy does not affect the authority 
of CMS, but simply provides instructions for enforcement, it is 
more likely not to be characterized as a “substantive legal 
standard.” Three cases—all applying the Circuit’s definition of 
“substantive legal standard”—explore the contours of this 
distinction. Two of these cases found that, because the policies at 
issue affected the applicable reimbursement regime, the policies 
were “substantive legal standards” under the Medicare Act. In the 
District of Columbia Circuit’s Allina opinion, the Circuit held that 
the Medicare payment fractions at issue were “substantive legal 
standards” under its definition, because the formulae 
“determine[ed] how much the hospitals [would] be 
reimbursed.” Allina, 863 F.3d at 943. Similarly, in Select 
Specialty, a district court for the District of Columbia applied the 
Circuit’s definition of “substantive legal standard” to a CMS 
policy (the “must-bill” policy) that required hospitals to bill state 
Medicaid before seeking federal reimbursement. 391 F. Supp. 3d 
at 61. Select Specialty concluded that the must-bill policy was a 
“substantive legal standard” because it “essentially changed the 
eligibility criteria for reimbursement under the Medicare Act.” Id. 
at 69. The last of the cases applying the Circuit’s definition found 
that the policy at issue, which merely provided instructions to 
direct enforcement, was not a “substantive legal standard” under 
the Medicare Act. In Clarian Health West, LLC v. Hargan, 878 
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reject the relator’s argument that the 24-hour policy was merely an 
interpretation of the prior standard and held that it was, rather, a “gap-
filler” which was, by reason of Allina explicitly, subject to notice-and-
comment obligations.230 The court held, apparently without seeing the 
need for any further analytical justification, that the: 
Relator cannot justify CMS’s failure to provide notice-and-
comment for the 24-hour policy by characterizing it as mere 
guidance on a preexisting standard when the policy, in substance, 
is a gap-filling exercise prompted by the ambiguity of the prior 
policy. . . . Since the 24-hour policy was contained in agency 
manuals that had not been promulgated pursuant to notice-and-
comment, Allina compels the conclusion that there can be no 
FCA liability on Relator’s . . . claims.231 
This case reinforces and applies some of the principles originating 
in the earlier cases bearing on the meaning of Allina, as well as 
demonstrates, albeit in a rather conclusory manner, that a rule that is 
substantive, but not properly adopted, cannot serve as a basis for 
bringing an FCA claim based on legal falsity. This is because the theory 
of legal falsity posits that it is a fraud on the government to request 
payment for an item or service with undisclosed knowledge of 
circumstances that would cause the government to refuse payment of 
the claim.232 If an FCA case is predicted on a theory of legal falsity it 
must, therefore, allege non-conformance with binding law.233 
 
F.3d 346 (D.C.C. 2017), the Circuit applied its definition to a 
policy expressed in a manual that provided criteria to guide 
healthcare insurers in selecting hospitals for reimbursement 
reconciliation. Clarian found that this policy was not a 
“substantive legal standard” because it “merely set forth an 
enforcement policy that determines when [private healthcare 
insurers] will report hospitals for reconciliation [to adjust 
reimbursement received].” Id. at 378–79. According to the Clarian 
court, in finding that the policy was not a substantive legal 
standard, the “important point [was] that the agency maintain[ed] 
the same authority . . . that it had prior to the adoption of the 
Manual instructions.” Id. at 378. 
 Id. at 934–35. 
230. Id. at 936. 
231. Id. 
232. See supra, notes 6–9 and accompanying text. 
233. A claim is legally false when the claimant has falsely certified, either 
impliedly or explicitly, that, in the process of delivering the item or service 
for which reimbursement is claimed, she complied with a statute or 
regulation that is a “material condition of payment.” See supra, note 48, 
note 41, and accompanying text; see also Franklin, supra note 203, at 279 
(arguing in the context of the APA that: “rather than asking whether a 
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Substantive requirements that are not properly adopted are not 
binding, nor, as we discuss below, can they be material. 
2. Deviation from Procedural Standards Cannot Serve as a Basis for 
FCA Liability 
As discussed above, procedural requirements, by definition, do not 
create binding obligations on providers, but rather mediate the 
procedural aspects of the relationship between the agency and the 
provider.234 As they are not obligations that must be fulfilled in order 
to deserve payment, they cannot serve as a predicate for a FCA action 
based on legal falsity. Relatedly, it is difficult to imagine how non-
conformance with a procedural requirement could be materially 
misleading to the government, in the sense that the term is used in 
Escobar; which is to say with the non-compliance going to the essence 
of the bargain.235 Using the Ruckh court’s interpretation of what 
Escobar requires in this regard, in order for non-conformance to be 
material, it must result in “a material deviation in the value 
received.”236 Under this standard, procedural deviations that do not 
affect the value of what was received would not be material, and it is 
difficult to imagine a purely procedural requirement that is, and 
perhaps logically impossible for a purely procedural requirement to be, 
determinative of the value of the item or service for which 
reimbursement is claimed. Finally, as procedural rules are defined as 
involving interactions between the government and the provider, non-
compliance will generally be evident to the government prior to 
payment, and payment in the face of evident non-compliance would 
mitigate against considering the rule material. It would, moreover, be 
difficult to argue that a defect in a claim that was readily apparent to 
government actors responsible for paying the claim nonetheless 
rendered the claim a fraud. It would seem that, by definition, when the 
government pays a claim despite full knowledge of an open and 
unconcealed procedural defect, the procedural defect neither renders the 
claim a legal falsity nor materially deficient. For all of these reasons, 
 
challenged rule was designed to be legally binding in order to determine 
whether it must undergo notice and comment, courts should simply turn 
the question inside-out and ask whether the rule has undergone 
notice and comment in order to determine whether it can be made legally 
binding. Rules that have been through notice and comment would be 
accorded the force of law in later enforcement actions; rules that have not 
been through notice and comment would be denied such force. No longer 
would a rule’s substantive nature dictate its procedural provenance; 
instead, its procedural provenance would determine its substantive 
effect.”). 
234. See supra Section III.C. 
235. See supra, note 136 and accompanying text. 
236. United States v. Salus Rehab., LLC, 304 F. Supp.3d 1258, 1263 (M.D. 
Fla. 2018). 
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and others, it would seem that most, if not all, procedural requirements 
will be evidently minor or insubstantial. 
3. A Coherent Limitation on Predicates to FCA Liability 
When viewed in the context of the FCA, Allina creates a coherent 
gatekeeping mechanism that may serve to weed out the most unfair 
and unpredictable of FCA claims: those predicated on CMS’s rapidly 
changing sub-regulatory requirements and informal preferences. If only 
properly-adopted substantive standards can serve as a predicate for an 
FCA action, and the standard in question has not been adopted through 
notice-and-comment rulemaking, the case simply cannot proceed. 
Limiting FCA violations based on legal falsity to violations of 
substantive standards adopted via notice-and-comment rulemaking is 
rational and equitable. Without such a limitation, as evidenced by the 
inconsistent and convoluted body of FCA case law discussed in Section 
III of this piece, healthcare providers would be subject to the very real 
risk that they will not only be refused payment for items and services 
that were, indeed, rendered, but will also be subject to substantial (and 
often ruinous) penalties for violations of any number of sub-regulatory 
requirements the import of which they did not or could not grasp. In 
light of the failure of the FCA’s scienter standard to provide a 
meaningful limitation on FCA liability, it is appropriate, if not 
necessary, for the universe of requirements that may serve as predicates 
to FCA liability to be limited to those that have been subject to notice 
and comment, providing fair warning to healthcare providers that 
compliance may be a necessary condition of reimbursement. 
This approach does not define which requirements are, indeed, 
material under Escobar, but it does dovetail with the approach taken 
by courts that have construed Escobar’s materiality standard, 
concentrating on the issue of whether the non-conformance went to the 
“essence of the bargain.”237 Procedural missteps do not affect the value 
of the item or service rendered, while some, but not all, violations of 
substantive requirements could.238 Acknowledging that the FCA is a 
 
237. See Universal Health Servs. Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. 
Ct. 1989, 2003 n.5 (2016). 
238. This does not mean that non-compliance with a procedural rule could not 
have an effect on payment. A provider could, subject to appeal rights, be 
denied payment ultimately because of non-conformance with a purely 
procedural standard, such as missing a filing deadline for a cost report. 
However, a provider could not be prosecuted for an FCA violation on that 
basis. For example, non-compliance with standards that require that a 
provider maintain or submit particular documentation as proof of medical 
necessity (a statutory requirement) are either substantive, in which case 
they must be adopted by notice-and-comment rulemaking, or procedural, 
in which case, so long as non-compliance does not affect the value of the 
services provided, non-compliance with these standards cannot be a basis 
for an FCA action. The government could, however, in the absence of 
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statute that seeks to protect the government from being defrauded, it 
should be applied only when the government has, in fact, been tricked 
into paying for items and services that are not as valuable as 
represented.239 Having established non-conformance with a substantive, 
binding rule, it will still be necessary to establish that the non-
conformance was material.240 Engaging in the first inquiry will, however, 
vastly narrow the field of rules to which the materiality screen will have 
to be applied. 
IV. Applying Allina and Escobar to FCA Cases 
Taken together, Allina and Escobar create a three-step process for 
analyzing whether a violation of a given CMS requirement renders a 
claim false for the purposes of the FCA. In bringing an FCA case, post-
Escobar and post-Allina, the government is required to demonstrate 
that the defendant has violated a legally-binding, material condition of 
payment. Whether a law is binding and material are distinct threshold 
issues that should be analyzed in terms of whether the moving party 
has succeeded in stating a claim; that is, to determine: 1) if there is 
actually a law that is asserted to have been violated which is of a type 
with which non-compliance could render a claim false, and 2) whether 
the law was actually applied by the government as a material condition 
of payment. Once it is established that a defendant can be held to 
account under the FCA for non-compliance with a given requirement, 
courts must then ask whether the defendant knew, or should have 
known, that she had failed to comply with a requirement that was 
material to the government’s decision to pay a claim. 
 
such documentation, challenge the medical necessity of the claimed item 
or service, and, if the provider could be shown to have provided medically 
unnecessary services, such non-conformance with the law could serve as a 
predicate for FCA liability. 
239. Or, as is the case when the violation is predicated on a violation of the 
anti-kickback statute, are provided in a manner that is specifically called 
out as constituting a FCA violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(g). 
240. The materiality screen can also be used to answer the question of whether, 
and when, FCA liability can be predicated on non-conformance with the 
regulatory requirements of agencies other than CMS. It would seem that 
there is less likelihood that these requirements would be material to a 
CMS decision to pay than would be its own requirements. This approach 
would go a long way to resolving the odd dynamic created by Allina, 
which would allow the use of non-CMS sub-regulatory guidance, at least 
so far as the same constituted interpretive rules and, was thus, accorded 
deference, but not CMS sub-regulatory guidance, as a predicate for an 
FCA case. 
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A. STEP 1: The Standard from which the Defendant is Alleged to Have 
Deviated, Must be Expressed in Binding Law 
Allina holds that a CMS requirement that is substantive must be 
properly adopted in accordance with the procedural requirements of the 
Medicare Act.241 Under Allina, a substantive requirement cannot be 
read into a statute or regulation as a gap-filler and given legal import 
via judicial deference to define the substance of the statutory or 
regulatory requirement.242 A substantive requirement that is not 
properly adopted carries no authority beyond the power to persuade 
(and, certainly is not binding), and, thus, legal falsity cannot be 
predicated on non-conformance with such a requirement.243 
After Allina, it is relatively easy to identify those CMS 
requirements that are binding, as they must be set forth in properly-
adopted statutes, regulations, or NCDs.244 Under Allina, CMS sub-
regulatory guidance, such as that expressed in a Manual, an LCD, or 
in another contractor publication, simply cannot be used to create a 
substantive requirement that is not evident in properly-promulgated 
law.245 This is not to say that sub-regulatory guidance is without 
probative value. Requirements that do not receive full notice and 
comment simply lack value in establishing the substance of a standard 
against which non-conformance can be measured. Such a requirement 
may be probative under STEPS 2 and 3 below, by lending insight into 
whether the government considers a condition of payment, as 
promulgated, to be material to payment, or as evidence that the 
defendant likely knew the requirement to be material. A requirement 
that is not a binding substantive requirement, under Allina, may not, 
however be used to define the contours of the requirement itself.246 Take, 
for example, a hypothetical regulatory requirement that states that a 
physician’s signature must be obtained within a “reasonable” time after 
admission to a skilled nursing facility. Assume further that CMS has 
issued four transmittals and conducted seven trainings within the last 
year, each stating that payment will be denied if a signature has not 
been obtained within 72 hours. CMS’s sub-regulatory statements are 
not relevant to a determination of whether a skilled nursing facility that 
often obtains physician signature at 75 or even 100 hours after 
admission has violated a condition of payment. Such statements are, 
however, highly probative with respect to the question of whether the 
government considers the underlying requirement – that a physician’s 
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signature be obtained without undue delay – to be material to its 
decision of whether or not to pay a claim (STEP 2). As well, such 
statements may have a role in proving scienter (STEP 3). 
B. STEP 2: The Requirement Imposed by the Law Must be Material 
Under Escobar, the requirement must be one: (i) on which payment 
may, in fact, be conditioned,247 (ii) that is by nature material,248 and (iii) 
that in practice, is applied as a condition of payment by CMS.249 This 
means that, in addition to being a binding law (see STEP 1), the 
standard must be both material and demonstrably material to the 
government’s decision to pay. Not all rules that are adopted by notice-
and-comment rulemaking will be material, however, as some may be 
procedural. Thus, while evidence related to promulgation of the 
requirement (e.g., statements made in notices of proposed rulemaking) 
may be highly relevant to a determination of materiality, materiality is 
a distinct requirement that must be shown independent of a showing 
that the rule at issue is validly promulgated under the Medicare Act. 
C. STEP 3: The Defendant Must Know that the Requirement is 
Material to the Government 
The defendant must have the requisite scienter: she must know (or 
should know) that the requirement is material to the government’s 
decision to pay. Concluding that a requirement is material and 
authoritative, and is treated as such by the government is, therefore, 
necessary, but not sufficient, to find that failure to meet such a 
requirement could render a claim false. 
As a practical matter, because of the relative paucity and clarity of 
properly-adopted statutes and regulations, and the narrow scope of 
subject matter that NCDs may address, as compared to the volume and 
scope of sub-regulatory guidance, excluding standards that are not 
properly adopted as a basis for FCA liability predicated on legal falsity 
should have the practical effect of filtering out many immaterial terms 
(i.e., all of those that are purely procedural or insignificant enough not 
to merit formal rulemaking) and substantially reducing the guesswork 
related to establishing materiality. 
Conclusion 
In Escobar, the Supreme Court attempted to impose a reasonable 
constraint on the types of non-compliance that could serve as a 
 
247. For example, a requirement that was articulated optional, but not 
determinative of eligibility, could not be material. 
248. The Escobar Court held that materiality cannot be found where non-
compliance is minor or insubstantial. Universal Health Servs. Inc. v. 
United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 2002-04 (2016). 
249. Id. at 2003. 
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predicate for a FCA claim based on legal falsity.250 It held that in order 
for a healthcare provider to be subjected to the FCA’s harsh penalties 
under a legal falsity theory, she would have to have flaunted a 
requirement that was not a mere technicality, but, rather, one that was 
material to the government’s decision to pay the relevant claim. Owing 
in the main to the overwhelming volume and diversity of types of CMS 
regulatory and sub-regulatory guidance as well as the fact that the 
materiality test involves the exceptionally difficult task of assessing the 
subjective state-of-mind of the government, subsequent cases seeking to 
apply Escobar’s holding demonstrate that this requirement fails to 
create predictability and consistency. When coupled with the holding 
in Allina, however, it gains utility. Allina fundamentally alters the FCA 
landscape by articulating an objective test for determining which 
governmental statements have sufficient legal import to have binding 
legal effect; thereby not only narrowing the universe of potentially 
material standards, but also ensuring that the government has signaled 
its view of the materiality of the standard in a way calculated to give 
notice both of the standard and of its position that the standard is 
material. Read together, the holdings in these cases promote equitable, 
predictable, and consistent enforcement of CMS requirements by 
ensuring that the FCA is employed to enforce only those requirements 
that have been objectively demonstrated to be of sufficient importance 
to merit formal adoption. 
 
250. See id. at 8. 
